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ABSTRACT OF THE THESIS
THE PROGRESSIVE CATHOLIC CHURCH IN BRAZIL, 1964-1972:
THE OFFICIAL AMERICAN VIEW
by
Sigifredo Romero
Florida International University, 2014
Miami, Florida
Professor Ana Maria Bidegain, Major Professor
This thesis explores the American view of the Brazilian Catholic Church through the
critical examination of cables produced by the U.S. diplomatic mission in Brazil during
the period 1964-1972. This thesis maintains that the United States regarded the
progressive catholic movement, and eventually the Church as a whole, as a threat to its
security interests. Nonetheless, by the end of 1960s, the American approach changed
from suspicion to collaboration as the historical circumstances required so. This thesis
sheds light on the significance of the U.S. as a major player in the political conflict that
affected Brazil in the 1964-1972 years in which the Brazilian Catholic Church, and
particularly its progressive segments, played a fundamental role.

v

TABLE OF CONTENTS
CHAPTER

PAGE

CHAPTER 1 ........................................................................................................................1
Introduction ..........................................................................................................................1
Literature Review.................................................................................................................3
CHAPTER 2 ......................................................................................................................10
Analysis of Sources............................................................................................................10
Methodology ......................................................................................................................18
CHAPTER 3 ......................................................................................................................22
Historical Background .......................................................................................................22
Historical Context of the 1960s Decade ............................................................................33
Changes in the Vatican ......................................................................................................38
United States and Dictatorship...........................................................................................41
CHAPTER 4 ......................................................................................................................49
Determinants of the American Interest ..............................................................................49
The Dangerous Church ......................................................................................................51
The Conflict Begins ...........................................................................................................57
The Church and Students ...................................................................................................61
A Turning Point .................................................................................................................66
A Modern Martyrology ......................................................................................................70
Collaboration for Social Change ........................................................................................75
The Transformation of the Church ....................................................................................85
The Church and Human Rights..........................................................................................92
CHAPTER 5 ......................................................................................................................98
Who is Observed? ..............................................................................................................98
Students ..............................................................................................................................99
Bishops.............................................................................................................................100
Dom Hélder Câmara ........................................................................................................103
CHAPTER 6 ....................................................................................................................115
Conclusions ......................................................................................................................115
Further Research Possibilities ..........................................................................................122
BIBLIOGRAPHY ............................................................................................................124
APPENDICES .................................................................................................................129

vi

CHAPTER 1
Introduction
The role of the Catholic Church in the public life during the military dictatorship
that ruled Brazil between 1964 and 1985 has been the object of an important debate in the
Brazilian and the brazilianist American historiography. There is no surprise that in that
time of important political transformations, the Church played a definitive role. In this
thesis I explore the U.S. views and interests in the Brazilian Church during the years
1964-1972, which correspond to the first period of the dictatorship.
The present research is underpinned by the controversial role the United States
played in Latin American politics in the decades of the 1960s and 1970s. Particularly in
the Southern Cone, those were years marked by the imposition of military dictatorships
that were supported by the US.1 Those regimes abolished democracy and implemented
dirty war policies under which thousands of people were tortured, murdered and
disappeared. The Brazilian regime belongs to that tradition and the support it derived
from the United States is common knowledge.2

1

See William Blum, U.S. Military and CIA Interventions since World War II (Monroe, Me.: Common
Courage Press, 2004).

2

The documents that proved the military support of Lyndon B. Johnson’s government to the rebels of 1964
were declassified in 2004 and can be consulted freely. See: “Brazil Marks 40th Anniversary of Military
Coup: Declassified documents shed light on U.S. role,” National Security Archive, last modified February
9, 2014, http://www2.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB118/index.htm

1

Along with other segments of Brazilian society, the Church was the object of
persecution and repression by the military because of the political commitments of some
of its members. The persecution led to a bitter confrontation between a major sector of
the Brazilian Church and the military government that marked the political life of Brazil
during those years. Although the so-called “Church-state relations” are a fundamental
piece of the U.S. American view of the progressive Brazilian Church, this research is not
limited to “Church-state relations.”
Instead, my intention is to understand the United States government’s political
views, conceptions of and interests in the Brazilian Catholic Church in the years 19641972. Those views and interests seem highly influenced by the ideological context of the
time. On one hand, the U.S. discourse of domination over Latin America was marked by
its Doctrine of National Security. On the other hand, by that time Brazil was the epicenter
of an emergent continental movement within the Catholic Church that challenged U.S.
hegemony and was known as Liberationist Christianity.3 In this context, the U.S.
establishment regarded the progressive wing of the Brazilian Church as a likely threat to
the American interests.4 Furthermore, the involvement of the CIA and other U.S.

3

I have borrowed the term “Liberationist Christianity” from Michael Löwy. It is, in my opinion, the most
appropriate way to describe what is commonly known as “Liberation Theology.” See: Michael Löwy, The
War of Gods: Religion and politics in Latin America (London: Verso, 1996), 32-33.
4

See: Richard L. Rubenstein and John K. Roth, The Politics of Latin American Liberation Theology: The
challenge to U.S. public policy (Washington, D.C.: Washington Institute Press, 1988).

2

agencies in the persecution of the liberationist movement has already been subject of
research.5
The present study focuses on the cables of the U.S. Foreign Mission in Brazil that
deal with the Church during the years 1964-1972 and analyses them in light of the
ideological trends and the political conflicts of the time. As a whole those documents will
be interpreted with a view to clarifying the perceptions, views and interests that surely
had an impact in US American foreign policy in Brazil. Taking into account that these
sources were hitherto unused, my hope is that this paper will add to a better
comprehension of the US role in the religious-political transformations of the last decades
in Brazil.
Literature Review
There is an important number of works and contributions to the different fields in
which this work is located. Repression, political persecution and the relation between the
military regime and the opposition has been the subject of important debates since the
very time of the dictatorship. State and Opposition in Military Brazil by Maria Helena
Moreira Alves of 1985, and the diverse reports of the Brazilian Peace and Justice
Commission are just two conspicuous examples.6

5

See: Penny Lernoux, Cry of the People: United States involvement in the rise of fascism, torture, and
murder and the persecution of the Catholic Church in Latin America (Garden City, NY: Doubleday &
Company, 1980).

6

Maria Helena Moreira Alves, State and Opposition in Military Brazil (Austin: University of Texas Press,
1985).

3

The most recent important contribution concerning U.S. participation in the coup
d’état of 1964 and its support of the subsequent military regime came in 2008 with O
Grande Irmão: Da operação brother Sam aos anos do chumbo by Carlos Fico.7 In the
review of the literature I will refer to the literature on the narrower field of the Catholic
Church in its political dimension during the first half of the dictatorship which has very
often been understood as Church-state relations.
A first important contribution in this regard came in 1971 as L’Eglise et le
Pouvoir au Brésil, translated to English in 1973 as Church and Power in Brazil.8 The
author, the French priest Charles Antoine, was a protagonist of the events, who was
forced to leave Brazil in 1969 as a result of government persecution. Antoine offers a
very detailed account and a clear understanding of the evolution of the Church’s role and
the political conflict with the military during the first five years of dictatorship. Very
significant events came after Church and Power in Brazil, events that would redefine the
1964-1969 period of Church-state relations but Antoine’s contribution remains relevant.
The characteristics of Antoine’s work would be present in most of the
historiography of the Church under the dictatorship. Firstly, since the Church-state
confrontation of the 1960s was a media phenomenon, newspapers and journals have been
a most important source of data. The press not only published stories on arrests of priests
and judiciary processes, but also used to publish the declarations and letters of bishops
verbatim. On the other hand, as a result of the military censorship and persecution of the
7

Carlos Fico, O Grande Irmão: Da operação Brother Sam aos anos de chumbo: O governo dos Estados
Unidos e a ditadura militar brasileira (Rio de Janeiro: Civilização Brasileira, 2008).

8

Charles Antoine, Church and Power in Brazil (Maryknoll, NY.: Orbis Books, 1973).
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intellectual sectors of Brazilian society, many of the contributions from those opposing
the military government to the field come from overseas.
Brazilian and Latin American efforts to understand this period of the Church have
focused on the different elements that form and explain Liberationist Christianity. Some
authors focus on Catholic Action and the student movement,9 others on the Basic
Ecclesial Communities,10 and yet others explain the emergence of Liberationist
Christianity as a continental process.11 Those phenomena, and particularly the political
aspect of the Church, have attracted the attention of American researchers as well.
Interest intensified by the end of the 1970s following the prominence of the Church in the
defense of human rights and the participation of Christians in the Sandinista revolution of
Nicaragua.
That is the framework for Cry of the People by journalist Penny Lernoux (see
note 5). Published in 1980, the book focuses on the struggle of important elements of
Catholic Church for the defense of human rights and a more egalitarian Latin America.
Lernoux sheds light on the persecution of progressive Christians by a conglomerate of
U.S. agencies, Latin American governments and transnational corporations, among
9

See: Ana María Bidegain, La Organización de Movimientos de Juventud de Acción Católica en América
Latina: Los casos de los obreros y universitarios en Brasil y Colombia entre 1930 – 1955, parte III (Brasil)
(PhD diss., Catholic University of Lovaina, 1979). Also: Luiz Alberto Gómez de Souza, A JUC: Os
estudantes católicos e a política (Petrópolis: Vozes, 1984).
10

Recent works about the Basic Ecclesial Communities have brought new interpretations. For a study with
gender perspective, see: Carol Drogus, Women, Religion, and Social Change in Brazil's Popular Church
(Notre Dame, IN.: University of Notre Dame Press, 1997). For an understanding of the decline of the
communities, see: Manuel Vásquez, The Brazilian Popular Church and the Crisis of Modernity
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998).

11

For a longue durée interpretation, see: Enrique Dussel, A History of the Church in Latin America:
Colonialism to liberation (Grand Rapids, MI.: William B. Eerdmans, 1981). For a most recent and
comprehensive view, see: Löwy, The War of Gods.
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others. Cry of the People has become a classic in the field for the breadth of its research,
the multiplicity of facts involved and the braveness of an author who denounces the
crimes of powerful institutions. Moreover, Lernoux brings new data and sources from
several documental niches, including the U.S. Congress, Amnesty International and the
documentation service of the U.S Conference of Catholic Bishops.
American brazilianist scholarship on the Catholic Church was also vitalized in the
1970s and 1980s decade. Among the authors who best know the Church during the
dictatorship Thomas Bruneau, Scott Mainwaring, Ralph Della Cava; and, more recently,
James Green and Kenneth Serbin, stand out. An early effort by an U.S. American
researcher to explain the situation of the Church in the 1960s decade was Thomas
Bruneau’s The Political Transformation of the Brazilian Catholic Church, published in
197412 which was followed in 1982 by The Church in Brazil: The politics of religion.13
While the first is a historical account that explains the ideological changes within the
Church, the second, by the time it was published, was a synchronic analysis of the
institution.
In 1986 Scott Mainwaring contributed to the debate with The Catholic Church
and Politics in Brazil 1916-1985, a work which followed the same pattern of diachronic
historical account as The Political Transformation, but also included the 1974-1985

12

Thomas Bruneau, The Political Transformation of the Brazilian Catholic Church (London: Cambridge
University Press, 1974).

13

Thomas Bruneau, The Church in Brazil: The politics of religion (Austin: University of Texas Press,
1982).
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period, not covered by Bruneau.14 The political performance of the Church during 19741985, period known as abertura, was also covered by the recognized brazilianist Ralph
Della Cava in a working paper published by the Kellogg Institute in 1988, The Church
and the Abertura in Brazil 1974-1985.15
Twenty-seven years passed between Antoine’s book and Kenneth Serbin’s article
“Anatomy of a Death,” published in the Journal of Latin American Studies in 1998.16
Serbin examines the assassination of student Alexandre Vannucchi Leme in 1973 and the
Church-state crisis that this event provoked. “Anatomy of a Death” is interesting, among
other factors, because it brings up the importance of the Vatican as an actor in the
political conflict. Moreover, Serbin analyses the Bipartite Commission, a space for a high
level negotiation between the Brazilian bishops and military in the1970-1974 years.
Precisely the Bipartite Commission would be the subject, two years later, of
Secret Dialogues that explores new dimensions in the political role of the Church and its
relation with the military.17 Serbin’s findings were possible because of new sources like
the archives of the repressive apparatus of São Paulo and Rio de Janeiro that were opened
to research by the mid-1990s, and documents of the Bipartite Commission, unsealed
since 1992 by General Antonio Carlos da Silva Muricy.
14

Scott Mainwaring, The Catholic Church and Politics in Brazil, 1916-1985 (Stanford: Stanford University
Press, 1986).

15

Ralph Della Cava, The Church and the Abertura in Brazil, 1974-1985 (Notre Dame, IN.: Helen Kellogg
Institute for International Studies, University of Notre Dame, 1988).

16

Kenneth Serbin, “The Anatomy of a Death: Repression, human rights and the case of Alexandre
Vannucchi Leme in authoritarian Brazil,” Journal of Latin American Studies, Vol. 30, No. 1 (Feb., 1998):
1-33.
17

Kenneth Serbin, Secret Dialogues: Church-state relations, torture, and social justice in authoritarian
Brazil (Pittsburgh, Pa.: University of Pittsburgh Press, 2000).
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Besides Serbin, there has been in the last years another important contribution to
the understanding of the role of the church under the dictatorship. James Green’s We
Cannot Remain Silent of 2010 is the first research in the field carried out after the
declassification of the documents that proved the U.S. government’s involvement in the
coup of 1964, which is an integral part of the book.18 However, that is not the subject of
We Cannot Remain Silent; rather the focus is the social movement that emerged in the
U.S. against the Brazilian dictatorship. The movement made a campaign of information
about human rights violations in Brazil and constituted a pressure group working to make
Washington change its policy of complicity. U.S. and Brazilian, Protestant and Catholic
religious networks would be determinant in this movement.
Taking into account the works already published and the development of the
debate, my thesis can contribute to the understanding of the international relevance of the
Catholic Church, its conflict with the military regime and the position of the United
States. Moreover, there is a longstanding need to introduce into the debate the sort of
sources that have been used here. The second chapter of this thesis is composed of a basic
and necessary examination of the sources, and includes a methodological outline of the
entire research. The third chapter is a historical contextualization that brings together all
the elements of the subject: the political role of the Church in Brazil, factors in
understanding the military dictatorship and the role of the U.S. in Brazilian affairs. The
fourth and fifth chapters are the core of this paper. In the fourth chapter, the sources are
interpreted with a diachronic approach that results in a narrative of the history of the

18

James Green, We Cannot Remain Silent: Opposition to the Brazilian military dictatorship in the United
States (Durham, NC.: Duke University Press, 2010).

8

Church in the 1964-1972 period from the American standpoint. The fifth chapter utilizes
the sources from a rather synchronic standpoint that takes into consideration and stresses
elements that would go unnoticed in the previous chapter. In the sixth chapter I present
the conclusions and suggest further research possibilities.

9

CHAPTER 2
Analysis of Sources
The originality of this research lies in the study of largely unused primary sources.
The contextualization and interpretation of those sources provide the narrative and
argument of my thesis. Therefore, it is imperative to undertake a most basic documental
analysis of the sources and make clear the methodological framework used to interpret
them.
Communication has been consubstantial to any form of political power. It is a
fundamental element for the development and consolidation of inner institutions as much
as for the relations with external forces. At least since Pharaonic epochs, rulers
established external relations through ambassadors and jealously guarded their records as
did the Venetian doges, the popes and all sorts of political leaders.19 The rigorous and
academic study of that sort of documentation is known as diplomatics.20

19

William Moran et al., Les Letres d’el-Amarna: Correspondance diplomatique du pharaon (Paris: Ed. Du
Cerf, 1987), 17-21. Cited in : Constance Vilar, Le Discours Diplomatique (Paris: Université de Bordeaux et
L’Harmattan, 2008), 84.
20

The term comes from the Greek diploi that means “folded” and originally referred to the documents that
were delivered to the soldiers of the Roman Empire when they were licensed. The term was later applied
for extension to any solemn document. In the seventeenth century Jean Mabillon (1632-1707) founded the
discipline of diplomatics by doing extensive research to determine the authenticity of mediaeval
documents. Along with paleography, also developed by Mabillon, diplomatics became a fundamental pillar
of history.

10

The modern diplomatic discourse that emerged with the Peace of Westphalia
(1648) is built upon the reciprocity of diplomatic relations and the respectability of the
diplomats whose immunity every contemporary state is supposed to recognize.
Represent, negotiate and observe are the three basic functions of any diplomatic service.
In practice, however, the difference between observation and espionage is blurred, hence
the informal “honorable spies” attributed to seventeenth century ambassadors. In
principle, the legality of the means used to obtain the information is the basis for
discriminating between observation and espionage. Albeit, the difference is unclear
especially in times of crisis and has led to no few problems among rival nations through
history.21
It is worth noting that the diplomatic capacity of a state, just like its military
strength, depends on its economic superiority. Moreover, in a relation of dependence very
often the satellite state assumes an ambiguous attitude towards espionage on its own soil.
Sometimes, when subordinate nations deal with a real or constructed threat from an
internal enemy, they even accept information gathered by external forces. Precisely that
scenario could have been possible for the U.S.-Brazil diplomatic relations during the
dictatorship.
The 1960s and 1970s were far removed from the technological advances that have
since made the U.S. National Security Agency (NSA) one of the largest intelligence
organizations of the world. Given the lack of current day technology, during those years
the diplomatic corps were the eyes and ears of the United States government abroad.

21

Vilar, Le Discours Diplomatique, 94-115.
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Furthermore, the U.S. had and still has the most robust Foreign Service in the world and
its functionaries emit a huge amount of information every day. Cables are the official
way of communication for ambassadors, consuls and reporting officers and have been an
important source of information for historians.
The U.S. Foreign Service cables deal with several topics. They report about
economic and political events, situations and tendencies and all of this, of course, paying
particular attention to the interests and security of the United States. Regarding politics,
by the 1964-1972 years, the Foreign Mission in Brazil reported mainly about the changes
in the balance of power of the regime, alterations of the public order, student and labor
movements, political repression, human rights violations, the Catholic Church and its
conflicts with the state.
The information and analysis provided eventually have an impact in the
international policy of the U.S. government and its diplomatic relations.22 But the cables
do not only go to the Department of State; they also inform other diplomatic missions
around the globe and different U.S. agencies and departments including the CIA and the
Pentagon in cases of National Security issues. All the information of the Service is kept
and preserved by the National Archives and Records Administration (NARA), today the
largest state archive in the world. NARA states:
American foreign affairs is [sic] a key issue in United States history. The Department of State is
designated to lead in the overall direction, coordination, and supervision of American foreign
22

Peter W. Galbraith, “How to Write a Cable: A veteran diplomat explains how it’s really done,” Foreign
Policy, February 22, 2011. Accessed February 9, 2014, http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2011/02/22/
how_to_write_a_cable. Clearly, cables and communications about internal affairs of the embassies, visas
etc., are completely out of consideration in this study.

12

policy and foreign relations. Since World War II, a community of agencies has evolved to deal
specifically with foreign policy issues. In addition, many other agencies have taken on important
roles in American national security affairs.23

During the spring-break of 2013, Professor Ana Maria Bidegain and I, with the
support of the Department of Religious Studies, did an extensive research at the National
Archives in College Park, Maryland. We ran straight into the section “U.S. Embassy,
Brasilia” in the collection “Records of the Foreign Service Posts of the Department of
State”. Those records consist mainly of unclassified and declassified cables from the
diplomatic posts in Brazil.
We picked up all the documents that deal with the Catholic Church between 1964
and 1972. A total of 167 documental packets, saved in 13 boxes, for a total of 552 pages
were selected, photographed and classified. Every packet is constituted by a single cabledocument, though some of them contain two or three enclosures composed of
memorandum of conversations, quantitative data, copies of speeches and public
declarations etc. In my research, those enclosures are not treated as independent
documents since they make sense only with the other parts of the cable to which they are
attached. The average number of pages per cable is 3.5, and only two of them exceeded
20 pages.
All the cables are composed of basically four parts. First comes the head that can
take one third or the whole first page; it is devoted to the technical information of the

23

“Foreign Affairs and International Topics,” National Archives, last modified February 9, 2014,
http://www.archives.gov/research/foreign-policy/index.html
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cable including remittent, addressee, location, date, and the topic explained in a few
words. Right after the head, the reporting officer writes a few lines or paragraphs
summarizing the content of the cable so those who read it can know the topic without
having to read the whole document. After this comes the body of the document. In the
case of long cables, this takes several sections; very short cables, like telegrams, do not
go beyond a few lines.
Finally, at the end of the longest cables the officers usually write a few lines
entitled “comments” that contains very concise analysis of the situation described. For
analytical purposes this is the most important part of the document, since it adds the
personal interpretation of the redactor of a document. The comments nuance what the
press reports and go further into the meaning of particular facts. On no few occasions, the
comments of the redactor include predictions on the behavior of the actors and on the
development of the events in the short term. For analytical purposes I have classified the
documents into four types.
Telegrams. From the 167 cables, 70 are telegrams that contain a total of 103 pages.
Telegrams tend to be the shortest type, and rarely exceed three pages. The telegram is the
fastest way of communication and is, in general, used to send information about the
important news of the moment or very specific events. Thus the analytical potential of a
telegram is not extraordinary and sometimes the information they contain does not add
much to what the redactor has taken from news and other sources of information.24

24

The reader might notice missing words in some of the citations. This is consequence of the telegram style
that shortens the language and omits prepositions.

14

Reports of Conversations. The next important type of document in terms of quantity is
the Report of Conversation and there are 50 of this kind. 38 of them contain a total of 43
Memorandums of Conversations which are enclosures with a particular structure that
includes, in the first page, the participants, date, place and subject of the dialogue. The
remaining 12 cables have a rather free redaction structure but still refer to specific
conversations and interviews. All in all, the reports refer to 55 conversations for a total of
191 pages.
Reports of conversations are used by the diplomatic officers to summarize
informal conversations with key individuals of Brazilian politics. The officers invariably
deliver an assessment of their interviewees, their relevance, temper and usually political
positions. For instance, regarding a certain bishop, the officer may say that he is usually
held to be a progressive, that he is intelligent but risky, etc. The reported conversations
were sometimes the consequence of furtive and informal meetings where more than one
person took part; some were even held by telephone.
From the 55 conversations 51 focus on the Church as the central matter. The
remaining four deal only obliquely with it but are dedicated to other topics like the
student movement or the political polarization. A total of 57 people participated in
conversations with American officers, including 15 bishops, 19 priests (eight of them
Americans), one source in the Vatican Curia and four Catholic intellectuals, journalists
and professors. In contrast, only six military, three generals and three colonels,

15

participated.25 The remaining 12 recounted conversations with non-Catholic students,
intellectuals and politicians.
All kinds of cables, but particularly the reports of conversations, establish
important guidelines for the routes of diplomatic relations between the U.S. and other
countries. Through the cables the American government gets to know who is important in
a specific moment or situation and who is open to establish a collaborative relation. To
certain extent, to have a conversation with an American diplomat means talking to the
U.S. administration. Furthermore, people who regularly speak with the officers have
more chances to be regarded as an important interlocutor by the higher circles of the
government. In this way, bishops Dom Hélder Câmara, Dom Eugênio Sales and Dom
Agnelo Rossi, who were interviewed many times, must have been taken seriously by
Washington.
The reason for the numerous interviews with U.S. priests is not difficult to
understand. On the one hand, out of a historical deficit of churchmen, foreign priests,
including U.S. Americans, were a very important part of the Brazilian clergy and many of
them reached prominence. On the other, it stands to reason that American officers in
foreign countries actively seek to dialogue with people they can better understand, such
as their fellow citizens.
Reports. The third group of cable I have used is called simply “report;” there are 37 of
them. Nonetheless, it is the biggest group in number of pages with 235 as a whole. The
25

This is in conversations in which the Catholic Church was brought up. Most likely, the American officers
had many more conversations with the military but not all of them would have had the Church as one of the
topics. Moreover, conversations with members of the high circles of military power would deal with
sensitive information that remains classified.

16

report is the most standardized of the cables and is mainly used to provide information
with a deeper analysis than the telegram. In order to better understand this type of cable, I
have classified them as 1) periodical reports, 2) major reports, 3) minor reports and 4)
reports about speeches and public declarations.
There are four periodical reports that inform about a broad range of topics
including the student movement, the balance of power within Church and military and
similar overviews. The period that these reports cover vary between one week and six
months. On the other hand, there are four major reports which are documents of more
than 10 pages and constitute the type of report most complete, best structured and most
deeply thought out. Conversely, the minor reports deal with specific events and news;
there are 17 of them. Finally, there are 12 reports that inform about speeches and public
declarations mainly from the Episcopal Conference or individual bishops. In the political
confrontation between Church and military, speeches, interviews and public declarations
acquired an important political weight.
Others. The remaining 10 documents evade an easy classification. There are seven
telegrams headed “Department of State” that contain instructions and requests from
Washington. There is also a small group of three cables of different types. The first is a
biographical data form about bishop Dom Jerônimo de Sá Cavalcante, administrator of
the São Bento convent in Salvador de Bahia; the second is a single page called
“Memorandum of the files” that seems to belong to a bigger documental packet which
was lost in the records; the last one is a telegram headed “airgram.”

17

Methodology
Given that my sources are kept in the official archive of the U.S. government,
authenticity does not represent a problem. Yet, veracity could still be called into question.
Prior to the redaction of any cable, the data and facts obtained by the reporting officer
went through personal processes of comprehension and interpretation. Thus the veracity
of the material must be questioned. In my thesis, the information is interpreted taking
advantage of the historical distance, taking into account the context of the document, and
confronting the data with other primary and secondary sources. All of that is knowledge
the officer did not have. However, this sort of analysis does not account for the main
point of this research. The objective here is neither revealing new facts nor falsifying the
existent historical data but rather to proceed in a discursive analysis of the sources in
order to understand the ideological position of the subject who writes.
The documents used for my research are selected, classified and analyzed in order
to extrapolate the constitutive elements of the U.S. American views and interests in the
Brazilian Catholic Church. I have tried, as much as I could, to let the documents speak
for themselves. Therefore, the research took the course that the sources suggested, so to
speak; the diachronic analysis prevailed and constitutes the backbone of the study.
Consequently most of the next chapter is a chronological account that explores the
variations of the American view of the Church along the years. A second variable of the
analysis was thematic. I chose the most constant subjects of interest for the Foreign
Service and did a brief examination of them in the fifth chapter. I have made use of
secondary sources, some of them cited in the literary review that focus on those particular
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themes: Church-state relations, human rights, the student movement, bishop Dom Hélder
Câmara, etc. In doing all of this, I have resorted to hermeneutics, discursive analysis and
comparative methods for historical purposes.
Although the cables that serve as the foundation for this study are intended to be
objective descriptions of reality, as any human expression, they reveal important things
about those who wrote them. When a diplomatic officer starts a conversation, and when
he sits to write the report, he is acting as an employee of his country. In both cases, the
function of the officer is to safeguard American interests. I will give one example of the
sort of analytical process that I have applied to these documents. On March 26 of 1969
the political officer Richard H. Melton wrote a cable concerning a conversation he had
held two days earlier with the writer and anthropologist Gilberto Freyre. The
conversation was actually an interview made by a correspondent of the Chicago Daily
News in which Melton participated. In his report, the officer wrote, paraphrasing Freyre:
The Church in Brazil is going through a spiritual crisis. People like Dom Hélder err in thinking
that the Church should devote itself exclusively to social concerns while neglecting the mystical
aspect of religion. Communists would like to use Dom Hélder as a vehicle to capture power, and
he is vain enough to accept their support.26

To this remarkable comment, more than one level of analysis can be applied. First
of all, there is no need to think that the officer is not paraphrasing Freyre. The ideological
differences between Freyre and Dom Hélder were well known, so it is very likely that the
anthropologist would refer to the bishop in those terms.
26
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Nevertheless it is worth reflecting on the capacity of the officer to lead the
conversation to certain fields. When the officer asks his interviewee for his opinions
about the Church, he is already influencing in the final result of the conversation and
hence in the final report.27 Unfortunately, the officers did not write their reports of
conversations with question-answer structure. Yet nothing stops me from assuming that a
report of conversation actually refers to a conversation and not to a monologue in which
the diplomatic officer is just a receptacle of information.
While the reporting officer might or might not have had an active role in the
conversation itself, the exercise of writing the report is completely his. This conversation
took place on March 24 but the report was not sent until March 26. When writing the
cable, the officer clarified that he used the notes of the journalist which means that
between the conversation and the writing of the report there was a period of time that
may have been up to two days. It is worth considering the mental process of the officer
during this period of time and how his own ideas and interests would have found their
way through the writing of the report.
The personal ideas and interests of the officer, when talking to Freyre and when
writing the report, helped give form to the final cable, ergo to the American view of the
Catholic Church. The officer does not only have an active role in the conversation, and
the capacity to change the word “progressive” for “controversial” or “polemic” in the
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report. He also has a role in selecting the information he collected, leaving out what he
considers unimportant and stressing what he considers relevant.
For the officer Melton it was important to say (that Freyre said) that Dom Hélder
Câmara could eventually become a vehicle of communism. That was important
information to share. To conclude, even though it seems that the officer is only
transmitting the opinion of one of the most important intellectuals in Brazilian history, he
is in fact sending an alert to Washington regarding the dangerousness of Dom Hélder to
U.S. interests.
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CHAPTER 3
Historical Background
Brazilian history and society stands off from Spanish-speaking America.
Language and immense natural barriers have contributed to the isolation of Brazil from
the rest of the subcontinent. Furthermore, Brazilian processes of colonization,
independence and social change have been carried out in very different ways. One of the
most conspicuous elements of the difference is the compromising character of those
processes. In comparison to the sociological violence of countries like Mexico and
Colombia, or the political polarization of Chile and Argentina, Brazil, where neither
violence nor polarization are absent, presents a record more of accommodation. The
Brazilian Catholic Church and its role in the political realm are singular as well.
The Church had not played nearly the same role to consolidate absolutism in
Portugal as it did in Spain. Hence it had a less important role in the imposition of the
colonial apparatus in Brazil. Furthermore, in a territory almost as large as the rest of
South America, the Catholic Church experienced serious difficulties in covering Brazil
with priests and missionaries and developing the diocesan structures. Yet the Church was
a fundamental pillar of Brazilian society during the colonial times. With the

22

establishment of the independent Empire of Brazil in 1822, and particularly under the
reign of Pedro II (1831-1889), the Church became entirely subjected to the state.28
Later on, with the advent of the republic in 1889, state and Church separated and
the latter was left outside of the official public realm. For the political elites that had
enthusiastically embraced the European ideologies of progress and secularization the
Church did not represent a sufficiently modern institution for a new Brazil. For the
Church, on the other hand, splitting from the state meant achieving independence.
During the1920s, as the nation underwent deep economic changes and a decline
of the republican order, the Church advanced in its unification and started gaining
importance in the public realm again. Both processes were tied to the leadership of Dom
Sebastião Leme da Silveira Cintra, better known as Dom Leme (1882-1942), archbishop
of Olinda and Recife since 1918, of Rio de Janeiro since 1930 and first Latin American
cardinal. Under his guidance, the different dioceses in which the Church was divided at
the time started having a common agenda.
Dom Leme wanted to gain for the Church a leading role in the political space
without becoming a client of the state. He also endeavored to re-Christianize the
Brazilian elites that, in his opinion, had fallen to modern ideologies.29 Dom Leme focused
on reorganizing the laical associations in existence and developing a Catholic
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intelligentsia.30 His policies were in agreement with the transformations of the Church in
Europe.
As part of the process of modernity, liberal and socialist metanarratives and
movements had been emptying Catholicism of followers and power. Towards the end of
the nineteenth century the Church finally gathered new impulses to reestablish its lost
connection with the city of man. However, in order to survive in a modern world, it had
to embrace some modern ways. For instance, to fight against liberalism and socialism, the
adoption of organizational processes typical of those movements was necessary.
That is how in the second half of the nineteenth century there had emerged in
Europe, Catholic unions, parties and movements of lay persons active in pastoral
activities; the latter would be eventually known as Catholic Action, a movement which
had started in Italy. Within Catholic Action, lay people, particularly young students and
workers, were called to have a more active role in the conservation and expansion of the
Church, though under the strict rule of the hierarchy. In this way the clergy was able to
penetrate spaces from which the Church had been banished during the process of
secularization. In terms of hierarchical structure and conception of the world, this sort of
organization was highly conservative. That was the kind of Catholic Action that, with the
support of Dom Leme, was introduced to Brazil in the 1920s.31 The experiment would
prove successful in a country with a historical lack of clergy.
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In order to promote Catholic ideology, in 1922 Dom Leme and the Catholic leader
Jackson de Figuereido founded the Dom Vital Center. The Center was frequented by
ardent integralistas who, via the A Ordem journal, disseminated reactionary religiouspolitical ideas.32 Both the development of a Catholic intelligentsia and the spread of lay
organizations like Catholic Action strengthened the position of the Church in the public
realm during the 1920s and paved the way for the reconciliation with the state in the
1930s.
In October of 1930 a revolution led by Getúlio Vargas took power and put an end
to the republic. During the next 15 years of Vargas’ rule, Brazil lived through enormous
advances in industrialization, modernization and a significant expansion of the
economy.33 As the cities grew, the middle classes and the proletariat, precisely the basis
of Vargas’ political support, strengthened numerically and politically. In the case of the
workers, Vargas stimulated the growth of labor unions under the strict control of the state
and in 1932 promulgated a law that allowed working women to vote.34
Although Vargas faced significant opposition including armed insurrections, the
1930s was a period of optimism and national pride. Arts and popular culture flourished as
musicians and intellectuals produced works and interpreted their times with keen national
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fervor. At the same time, the ambitions and worldview of Brazilians acquired a renewed
cosmopolitan character while the education system modernized and expanded from basic
to higher level.
Nonetheless, the Vargas’ era was also characterized by centralization and
concentration of power in the hands of Vargas. Despite the undeniable authoritarian and
at times fascist character of his government that drew on censorship and the outlawing of
movements such as communism and integralismo, Vargas followed the compromising
trend of Brazilian political history.35 He maintained relations with the coffee-based elites
and the industrialists, ruled for the middle class and the proletariat and was supported by
both military and churchmen.
During the 1930s Church and state reintegrated and provided incommensurable
services to each other. Dom Leme had played a fundamental role in Vargas’ rule from the
very beginning. In the days of the revolution, the bishop served as a mediator and
facilitated the removal from power of President Washington Luís ergo the ascension of
Vargas. In 1931 Dom Leme organized monumental mobilizations of devotion to Our
Lady of Aparecida and the statue of Christ the Redeemer was inaugurated in Rio.
Nowadays both are powerful symbols of the presence of the Church in quotidian life
through which Brazil is configured as a Catholic nation.36
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Vargas saw in the Church a fundamental piece of both the new Brazil he was
building and the balance of power that maintained him 15 years in power.37 He
stimulated the expansion and influence of the Church in education, beneficence and
public administration, and obtained in the process ideological legitimation. The Church,
in turn, not only expanded its reach to the lowest segments of the population but also
participated in the decision-making process in public affairs.
Dom Leme had authorized, in 1932, the creation of the Catholic Electoral League
(Liga Eleitoral Católica, LEC), a pressure group with enormous power, through which
the Church influenced the election of sympathetic candidates and thus the promulgation
of laws that favored the position of the Church and its values.38 The LEC and the female
Catholic organizations had enormous influence in the redaction of the Constitution of
1934:
Spiritual assistance was allowed in official and military establishments. The religious marriage
was entirely recognized in the same terms as the civil and divorce was prohibited. The most
important thing for the Church was the constitutional recognition of the religious education in
39

public schools and the economic subvention by the state to the Catholic schools.

Dom Leme, on the other hand, had direct influence on Vargas. The bishop was
particularly influential in the government’s decision not to establish diplomatic relations
with the Soviet Union as well as in the state attempts not to grant recognition to the
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divorce law imbedded in the Constitution of 1937.40 That charter was the Estado Novo
legal framework: the 1937-1945 period during which Vargas strengthened his
authoritarian power and carried out most of his ambitious reforms; during that time, the
Church-state marriage kept bearing fruits for both institutions.
Meanwhile, as Catholic Action grew, its connections with European and North
American lay experiences strengthened. In the decade of the 1940s, Canadian priests and
young lay Catholics themselves brought to Brazil the French model of Catholic Action.
The French tradition, a truly modern way of lay apostolate in content and organization,
gradually permeated and redefined Brazilian Catholic Action.41 The starting point of the
French model had been the Young Catholic Workers movement, founded by the Belgian
priest Joseph Cardijn in 1912.42
Cardijn’s method of Catholic Action was called “revision of life.” It is constituted
by three steps in the relation between individuals and reality: see, judge and act. With this
perspective, and in sharp contrast with traditional theology, Cardijn stimulated the young
workers to think critically. Later on, movements of this kind flourished in universities
and high schools, particularly in France and Canada.
In no other Latin American country did Catholic Action expand and grow as
much as in Brazil. The movement thrived, with particular power in universities
40
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(Juventude Universitária Católica, JUC), factories (Juventude Operária Católica, JOC)
and secondary schools (Juventude Estudantil Católica, JEC). Through those
organizations an entire generation of young Catholic Brazilians developed a modern way
to live their religiosity, acquired skills in organization, and became aware of the deep
social problems of their society.
An important condition for that was, again, the lack of native clerics because of
which the Brazilian Church had to rely on foreign clergy. There was a constant flow of
priests, chiefly from Canada, France, Belgium and the United States. They, and the young
Catholics who traveled to attend the international meetings of their organizations, kept
Brazilian Catholicism in pace with the latest developments, in praxis and thought, of the
European churches.
Even the Dom Vital Center, once the fortress of the most conservative Catholic
thought, helped in the development of the new Church that Catholic Action was creating.
Its founder, Jackson de Figuereido, had died prematurely in 1928 and the Center was left
in the charge of the intellectual and leader, Alceu Amoroso Lima. Under Alceu, the Dom
Vital Center became a network that spread the French Catholic humanism of thinkers like
Jacques Maritain, Emmanuel Mounier, Ives Congar, and others.43
In 1945, as the liberal states emerged triumphant from the defeat over fascism in
World War II, Brazil moved towards democracy. Then the restless opposition to Vargas
strengthened enough to put an end to the Estado Novo. In the almost 20 years of
democratic governments that followed, Brazil continued through the path of development
43

Gómez de Souza, A JUC, 59.

29

and compromise among the different parties. The marriage of convenience with the
Church remained unaltered.
The 1950s would be marked by the revitalization of the national consciousness
pushed by the turn of the economy towards oil. During his last term as president (19511954), Getúlio Vargas propelled a movement for the defense of Brazilian resources that
ended up with the foundation in 1953 of Petrobras, currently one of the major exploiters
of oil in the world. The motto “the oil is ours” (o petróleo é nosso) helped to strengthen
the national spirit in Brazil.
Dom Leme’s death in 1942 had left a vacuum in the ecclesiastical leadership. A
young and always intrepid Hélder Câmara, as priest first and bishop after, took on his
shoulders the responsibility for organizing the dioceses under an institutional entity with
national scope that gave cohesion to the Church. He was vicar of Catholic Action and had
contributed to the creation of the National Secretariat of the movement in the 1940s, at
the time the only organization within the Church with a national structure.
Hélder gathered the skills of some female lay elements from Catholic Action and
gained the support of Rome to create the National Conference of Brazilian Bishops
(Conferência Nacional de Bispos do Brasil, CNBB) in 1952;44 it was the beginning of a
truly national Catholic Church in Brazil. As a national institution unified at the top by the
CNBB, the Church reached its moment of major expansion and prominence in public life.
The governments recognized the power of the bishops, the Catholic press and
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intellectuals maintained a national audience, and Catholic Action had a leading role in the
social movement in schools, factories, and universities.45
Catholic Action was definitive for the Church in other ways. Visionary men and
women, young workers, students and peasants were having considerable influence with
the clergy at least since the 1940s.46 By the 1950s some of those priests who had been
close to the youth became bishops. Such is the case of Hélder Câmara. He had even
militated in the integralismo in the 1930s decade but by the 1940s had gotten deeply
involved with the Catholic Youth Workers and radically changed his political standpoint.
Dom Hélder, and other bishops like Dom José Tavora, Dom Fernando Gomes, Dom
Cândido Padim, and many others particularly from the Northeastern dioceses, became the
leadership of the progressive wing of the Church.47
Several factors contributed to the success of the Catholic progressive ideas in the
Northeast. During the nineteenth and twentieth century, as the southern regions
industrialized and urbanized, the Northeast suffered stagnation and even impoverishment.
In this region with the highest concentration of the land, the class abyss was more
profound than in the rest of the country. Therefore, the Christian inclination for the poor
faced in the Northeast an outrageous reality of social justice that looked like a bomb
about to explode.
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Having young and able bishops in the higher levels of the Church contributed to
the growth of progressive Christianity. Dom Hélder, for instance, was secretary of the
CNBB for several years, beginning with its foundation. The progressive bishops, well
respected and connected, maintained their influence in the state and used it to make their
dreams of social change real. Probably the most notorious case of the time was the
Movement for Basic Education (Movimento de Educação de Base, MEB), created in
1961 by bishop Dom José Tavora.
Dom Tavora drew on a literacy program conceived by bishop Dom Eugênio de
Araújo Sales in 1958 and gave it a new stronger spirit. The MEB, driven by the Church in
the Northeast and supported by the state, proved to be a highly successful literacy
program. Given that in Brazil the illiterate were not allowed to vote, with this program
the Church had an enormous impact in Brazilian politics and particularly in the
Northeastern. The MEB is an extraordinary example of the good relations of the
progressive wing of the Church and the reformist leaders of the 1950s and 1960s decades,
especially those of Jânio Quadros (1961) and João Goulart (1961-1964).
Although the progressive movement was the most important aspect of the Church
in the mid-twentieth century, Brazilian Catholicism still was the sum and contradiction of
several standpoints. The inner currents of the Church have usually been divided in
progressives, moderates and conservatives or traditionalists. The classification usually
depended on the approach to lay pastoral and the commitment to social issues. The inner
currents, in turn, were in agreement with a multiplicity of political options that reflected
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national trends. Some churchmen and lay people, for instance, opted for Christian
democracy and liberalism.
The Catholic right, on the other hand, was a very strong sector with deep roots in
the history of the Church. Meantime, the Catholic traditionalists, corporatists and
integralistas had established important alliances with the military and other reactionary
sectors that shared their worldviews; the result of that convergence was the creation of
the extreme-right movement Tradition, Family and Property (Tradição, Família e
Propriedade, TFP).48
Historical Context of the 1960s Decade
Such was the situation of the Brazilian Catholic Church by the end of the 1950s.
The 1960s would be years of deep transformations and unrest around the globe. African
decolonization, revolutionary outbreaks in several countries, emergence of diverse
subcultures in the West and the expansion and diversification of different ideologies of
liberation marked the 1960s. In the U.S. and Europe, the Civil Rights movement, the
opposition to the Vietnam War and the events of May-68 incorporated long-ignored
demands of gender, racial and ethnic equality.
Meanwhile, Latin America accelerated industrialization, expanded other spheres
of production and increased its participation in the international fluxes of capital.
Economic growth not only increased the capacity of the elites to rule but helped to raise
an urban middle class, everyday more ambitious and educated. As production and
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consumerism elevated and globalization consolidated, Latin American culture underwent
considerable modifications.
Capitalism, through the expansion of cinema, TV and mass media, altered the
conceptions of time and space and captivated the anguishes and desires of the entire
society. Along with an increasing sense of connection to the world and the growth of
urban cosmopolitan cultures, preexistent identities got enforced. Nationalism, for
instance, gained new relevance and ideologies of right and left took good advantage of it.
Nevertheless, development, as understood by the U.S. and the Latin American
elites, did not mean equality. Huge numbers of the poor population, in search of new
opportunities, moved to the cities only to end up crowding into the shantytowns of
México City, Buenos Aires and São Paulo. For them there was no economic growth, but
impoverishment and new ways of exploitation. The young Catholic students and the most
committed progressives within the Church were particularly shocked by this reality.
Everything was set for the reinvigoration of a revolutionary movement of
liberation in Latin America. Liberation movements are cultural currents composed by a
myriad of traditions, ideologies and even artistic trends that, depending on the historical
conditions, increase and decrease with the years. In some way, the movement of the
1960s was the coming to a new state of consciousness. Converging in that consciousness
were identities of class and nation, changes in the conceptions of history, new levels of
creativity, an increased disposition to social organization and cohesion among other
elements. The fundamental component of the movement in the 1960s decade was the
self-recognition of some segments of the population as members of a valuable culture,
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their decision to take control of the destiny of that culture and an inclination towards
social change.
The spark that ignited the movement and broke in two the history of Latin
America was the triumph of the Cuban Revolution in 1959. The success of Fidel Castro
and the very existence of a socialist country just 100 miles away from Florida gave hope
to a whole generation and reinvigorated the belief that Latin American societies could
rule their destinies out from under the shadow of the U.S. From the Rio Grande to La
Patagonia flourished diverse movements of young men and women who wanted to free
their countries in one way or the other from their dependence on the U.S. Cuba joined the
Soviet Union and to a lesser extent China as ideological and, at times, logistical supporter
of liberationist and revolutionary movements.
Obviously those who got to the revolutionary and liberationist level of
consciousness were those in the higher levels of education. Although still restricted to a
privileged minority, by the 1960s university education was expanding and more people
had access to it. Universities had traditionally been spaces of debate and alternative
political proposals and in the 1960s students became the most active and politicized
segment of the social movement. The importance of the student action was such that they
were commonly courted, targeted and even persecuted by governments, parties, the
Church and international interests namely American and Soviet.
The student movement had more intellectual resources than ever. In the 1960s,
faculties of social sciences and other institutes prospered while structuralism,
functionalism and other methodologies consolidated new and complex ways to
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understand society. If one particular theory marked the political and academic debate
more than any other, it was Marxism, which by this time was living a moment of
important modifications and expansion. It had been 20 years since the publication of
Marx’s Grundrisse, which had opened important and fertile debates concerning a
humanist Marx; cultural Marxism and other trends were in vogue, some in the theoretical
field and others as political narratives.
Marxists and a new generation of intellectuals paid particular attention to the
place assigned to Latin America in the international context. The elites that had ruled
since the nineteenth century were heirs of the Enlightenment and defenders of the ideals
of progress, democracy and the liberal state. Those ideals were in a clear contradiction
with the living conditions of the majority. The reformists (gradualists) claimed that this
was the consequence of underdevelopment. Latin America was in an early stage of
progress and by following the historical steps of Europe and the U.S., it would get to their
advanced stage of development. Thus, industrialization and modernization had to be
stimulated.
In contrast, in those years a new school of progressive intellectuals embraced the
dependency theory that relies so much on the Marxist view. This theory claims the
existence of exploitative relations between central and peripheral nations. The dynamics
of exploitation required that the latter sell basic raw products at low prices and purchase
manufactured goods at high prices. This unbalanced trade relationship ultimately gives
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rise to political domination.49 Dependency, therefore, does not only circumscribe the
economy. Instead, it is a multiplicity of systemic processes that take place in every aspect
of society, determining, for instance, the euro-centrism of nations like Brazil. The
generation of the 1960s decade had a precise name for all of this: American imperialism.
From dependency theory it was deduced that true development in Latin America
would only be possible once the relations of dependency were broken. In this way,
dependency theory, actively represented in Brazil through authors such as Theotonio dos
Santos and Ruy Mauro Marini, constituted a challenge to the basis of the liberal states in
Latin America and thus to the historical rule of the socioeconomic elites. The theory was
central for the movement of liberation in general and for progressive Catholic thought in
particular.
I have mentioned that the liberationist and revolutionary movement is a cultural
phenomenon that implies much more than politics, and embraces every facet of culture
including arts, philosophy and religion. For instance, although the writers of the Latin
American literary boom did not usually to refer to the concept of liberation, they were
part of that wave of self-recognition and cultural optimism of the 1960s decade that
entailed an unavoidable criticism of American imperialism. What that literary generation
had in common with the liberationists was an intense and creative identification with
their respective cultures. In their stories the characters and their relations, the landscapes
and the narratives as such were expressions of a renewed Latin American spirit.
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Changes in the Vatican
Important changes were taking place in the Vatican as well. The same year that
Castro triumphed in Cuba, Pope John XXIII called for a Second Vatican Council. The
Church had become aware of the need for a substantial reformation of its structures and
the spirit of Catholicism. Many churchmen felt that their Church was not able to catch up
with the fast and deep transformations of the modern world.
The Council (1962-1965) was the height of the process of modernization and
updating called aggiornamento and marked the most critical time for the Church since
the time of the protestant schism. It was the opportunity for the progressive sectors of
Catholicism to introduce changes in the form, content and spirit of Catholicism.
Anachronistic and even mediaeval laws and structures were suppressed and reformed; the
religious rites and regulations over clothing, behavior and function of the clergy were
updated. In some way, in order to keep the pace of history, the Church had to get rid of
too heavy robes.
Furthermore, the Council had an important ecumenical character. The Church
resolved to intensify the dialogue with other religions and conceptions of the world. This
opened the door to the dialogue with Marxism, something that philosophers like
Emmanuel Mounier had already done. Mounier (1905-1950) belonged to the French
tradition of Catholic thought that assumed a modern position in social and
epistemological issues. Jacques Maritain (1882-1973) is probably the best known of this
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school and his work went in the direction of a Catholic humanism. He was also
fundamental for the emergence of a democratic perspective in the Church.50
Another conspicuous figure was the Dominican Louis-Joseph Lebret (18971966), who made important contributions to the ethical reflections for the modern world.
Lebret, on the basis of Christian ethics, developed a profound criticism of capitalism and
neocolonialism. These thinkers were very influential in the mid-twentieth century and
were highly appreciated in the circles of Catholic Action. Most of the spirit of their
thought was captured in the documents of the Council and encyclicals like Populorum
Progressio (1967).
Behind-the-scenes of the Council, in informal meetings, Dom Hélder Câmara
played an important role in strengthening the ties among social-minded bishops and
gaining important spaces for the most progressive wing.51 Eventually, the Council
provided ideological legitimation to Catholic Action and the growing progressive
Christianity in Brazil. Bishops, priests and missionaries were encouraged to adopt the
Catholic Action methodology on the Latin American reality. What many Christians saw
was the undeniable reality of misery and exclusion in their countries. What they judged
was that that reality was unchristian. What they did was try to denounce and change that
reality.
In Brazil, however, the lay organizations had a sense of urgency for social change
that most of the episcopate did not share and this led to a crescendo of disagreement.
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Young students lived the contradiction of belonging to the Catholic Church and to the
revolutionary and liberationist movement at the same time.52 The involvement of
Catholic students in politics resulted in the formation of the movement Popular Action
(Ação Popular, AP) in 1962 during a congress of the JUC in Belo Horizonte.53 The AP
was the final logical step of a growing sector of Catholic youth that wanted to move from
a religious movement with political implications to a religiously-oriented political
movement.
Bishops in other Latin American churches had made consistent efforts, with
relative success, to cut off institutional ties with the politicized students. In Brazil the
youth had much more power, their structures had become important for the Church and
they counted significant support in the clergy and the episcopate itself. Thus in spite of
significant controversies with the most conservative wings of the Church, Catholic
Action in Brazil continued.54
However, a powerful enemy of the progressive churchmen was taking shape in
the shadows. When the reaction came in 1964 in the form of a coup d’état, the repressive
apparatus would make the Church pay a high prize for its connections with the students
and the nationalist and reformist governments of Kubitschek, Quadros and Goulart
(1956-1964).
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United States and Dictatorship
At least since the times of the formulation of the Monroe Doctrine in 1823, the
United States arrogated the right to intervene in Latin American and the Caribbean at
will. Military and economic supremacy in the rest of the continent was seen as a
condition sine qua non to fulfill the promise of American manifest destiny. During the
nineteenth century the U.S. consolidated its power, mainly in Mexico, Central America
and the Greater Antilles. Little by little, the British Empire lost its commercial supremacy
in the rest of the continent to the United States.
American interests in Latin America had since the nineteenth century permeated
every level of the economy, from mining and the cultivation of bananas to banking,
financial services and technology. In order to protect its capital and investments, U.S.
governments have resorted very often to force, and a myriad of other tactics in violation
of international conventions. The U.S. has suborned, blackmailed, sabotaged and
intimidated those governments and leaders that do not submit to its interests. When these
tactics do not work, the U.S .participates in murdering plots and armed uprisings that end
up with dictatorships human rights violations. On no few occasions the United States has
drawn on the supremacy of its naval fleet and army to punish societies and governments
that dare to oppose it.
Some of the most memorable U.S. interventions have been the invasion of
Mexico in 1846 that resulted in the dismemberment of more than 50% of the Mexican
territory, the bombing and destruction of San Juan del Norte Port in Nicaragua in 1854,
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the occupation of Cuba and Puerto Rico in 1898, of Honduras in 1924, and countless
incursions into Panamá, Nicaragua, the Dominican Republic and others.
Moreover, the United States emerged from World War II as a consolidated global
power and, in the years that followed, it achieved a considerable expansion of its capacity
for coercion in Latin America. Nevertheless, with the triumph of the Cuban Revolution,
anti-American sentiment extended all over Latin America. As the U.S. felt its hegemony
challenged, its militarist policy in the continent hardened.55
Even today analysts keep explaining the U.S.-Latin American relations of the
post-WWII era as framed and determined by the Cold War. In my opinion, this is a
misleading approach. By Cold War I understand the conflictive and dangerous conditions
of the bilateral relations between United States and the Soviet Union from the 1940s to
the 1980s. As part of the confrontation both nations indirectly disputed regions of
influence in the so-called third world. Such are the cases of Korea, Vietnam and
Afghanistan.
However, Latin America, far away from Russia, remained a North American
fortress; the U.S.S.R. never really had the potential to snatch any part of the U.S.
backyard. The Soviet intervention was limited to economic and intellectual support for a
few guerrilla groups and communist parties that never constituted a significant threat to
the liberal states. The real menace to the American hegemony in Latin America was the
growing articulation of demands for self-determination in the context of the Cuban
Revolution. In Latin America, “Cold War” was an ideological construct of the American
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establishment to create an atmosphere of fear, prone to the spread of the National
Security Doctrine, a militarist ideology originated by the French occupation in Algeria.
The American version of the Doctrine was the belief in a Cuban, Russian and/or
Chinese conspiracy to politically unsettle the region and institute communist rule. Those
who claimed to know the problem also asserted to have the solution. The doctrine held
that the communists would take over Latin America by brain-washing the people,
particularly the youth, with communist ideology. This implied the existence of an internal
enemy in universities, factories, countries and families. Western civilization had to fight
them.56
The new era of North American intervention in Latin America began in 1946 with
the foundation in Panamá of the School of the Americas.57 In the years that followed,
thousands of Latin American military officials went to the School to learn how to fight
the internal enemy. Torture, murder, disappearance of people and other techniques of
terror were some of the pedagogic content of the School through the years.58 The first
intervention completely driven under the doctrine was in Guatemala in 1954 where the
U.S. deposed the democratically elected government of Jacobo Árbens, igniting half a
century of horror that had its culmination in the indigenous genocide of the1980s.
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Between the 1960s and the 1980s a series of fundamentalist and authoritarian
dictatorships, backed and supported by the CIA and U.S. governments, were imposed in
several Latin American countries. These military regimes established censorship,
abolished and coopted democratic institutions, persecuted labor and student unions,
leaders of liberal and leftist tendencies, the intellectual elites of the time and anyone who
dared to oppose them; all in all they implemented what they had learnt in the School of
the Americas. They also imposed reforms that served the interests of the foreign capital
and the economic elites.59
The Brazilian military were particularly pro-American. Of all the Latin American
countries, Brazil was the only one that had made a serious effort to participate actively in
World War II.60 The Brazilian troops that battled in Italy in 1944 were trained by U.S.
officials and were greatly impressed by American organizational and technological
advances. Many of the leaders of the coup of 1964, including Generals Golbery de Couto
e Silva and Castelo Branco, belonged to that generation and had been in touch with the
American military since then.
The Higher War College (Escola Superior de Guerra, ESG) was created in 1949
in an effort to modernize and systematize the military education following the American
models and ideology.61 In a few years the ESG became the intellectual and political node
of the Brazilian military. It was a space for the military to discuss and develop their
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institutional positions regarding the future of the country. Since the ESG also provided
education to civilians, it helped the military to create close links with businessmen,
politicians and journalists and spread the National Security Doctrine.62 With the triumph
of the Cuban Revolution those links strengthened and became a political block that
counted on the support of the United States.
In August of 1961 the extreme right demonstrated its capacity for action by
creating a political crisis that led to the resignation of president Jânio Quadros. They
wanted to go further and impede the accession of Vice-president João Goulart but were
contained by the democratic reaction of the people on the streets.63 The nationalist and
reformist Quadros and Goulart were accused of populism and proximity to Marxism.
Their protectionist policies in economy, social reforms, reluctance to submit to the
American isolationist policy for Cuba and good relations with the social movement were
the target of bitter criticisms.64
Far-right politics had important links within the Catholic Church, an institution
with a long anti-communist tradition. Even the progressive bishops who opened the
Church to the dialogue with Marxism were afraid of the red menace. Communism was
seen as a dehumanizing ideology that wanted to liquidate family and impose a totalitarian
order where faith would be seen as nothing more than “opium of the people.” The
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persecution of Catholicism in the U.S.S.R. added no little component of fear to this
perception. In sum, communism was the negation of the most cherished Christian
principles.
In 1960 the most conservative Catholic sectors created Tradição, Família e
Propriedade (TFP) that was led by Professor Plinio Correa de Oliveira, bishops Dom
Sigaud, Dom Castro Mayer and others. TFP had much of its support in the south of the
country, among the traditional elites of São Paulo, and the political circles associated to
the ESG, from which it received enormous financial help.65
This ultraconservative movement began a campaign of incendiary declarations
and mobilizations in defense of western Christian civilization and against the danger of
communism. As political polarization deepened, Manichaeism flourished and Brazil got
immersed in a discursive spiral of violence. Politicians like Carlos Lacerda, bishops like
Dom Jaime Barros Câmara, and tendentious journalists preached the red danger. Terms
like “Marxist” and “terrorist,” emptied of content, were used to discredit the smallest
suggestion of social change. The campaign of destabilization gained support for an
authoritarian regime, weakened the government and set the conditions for the coup d’état.
The U.S. participation in the coup of March-April of 1964 has been sufficiently
documented. In the last decade, declassification of audio tapes of the White House and
cables of the Department of State have brought to public light what had been a wellknown secret for years.66 The Johnson administration had inherited from Kennedy a
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profound animosity towards the government of Goulart and was more than ready to
support an antidemocratic change of regime. In the days prior to the coup, the U.S.
government, at the request of the ambassador in Brazil, Lincoln Gordon, decided to fully
support the military revolution. During the critical moments, Johnson’s government
commanded the shipment of a naval task force, arms, ammunition and petroleum to
support the military.67
Right after the coup, the U.S., faced with the problem of being aligned with an
overtly authoritarian government, began a policy of comprehensive paternalism that
lasted for more than one decade. Ambassador Gordon repeatedly showed himself
concerned with the “excesses” of the military but continued advocating for economic
help to the regime. In the first two years of dictatorship, the United States loaned around
$450 million to the Brazilian government and maintained a policy of public silence in
regards to political repression.68
As a corollary to this historical contextualization, I would like talk briefly about
the chiefs of the Foreign Service in Brazil during the time that concern this research.
Ambassador Gordon, who was in office between 1961 and 1966, had an outstanding
diplomatic career and became Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American affairs
right after leaving Brazil. His academic career was no less remarkable; he taught
international economic relations in Harvard and was president of Johns Hopkins
University between 1967 and 1971. The presence of a diplomat of Gordon’s status points
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to the strategic significance of Brazil for the United States during the decisive aftermath
of the Cuban Revolution.69 In the same way, in comparison to the coming years, the
American presence and interference in public affairs was most vehement during the
service of Ambassador Gordon.70 Gordon was replaced in 1966 by John W. Tuthill, still
an outstanding diplomat, though his career was modest in comparison to Gordon’s.
Charles Burke Elbrick replaced Tuthill in March of 1969 under the Nixon administration.
The last ambassador to Brazil for the time of this research was William Manning
Rountree who took possession in November of 1970.
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CHAPTER 4
Determinants of the American Interest
The 167 cables of the Foreign Service in Brazil are irregular during the 19641972 years. Still, they follow a pattern that helps in understanding the basic determinants
of the American interest in the Brazilian Catholic Church.71 The periods with a higher
frequency of cables related to the Church coincide with periods of increasing relevance of
the Church or its members in the civil realm.
A rise of the relevance, in the short term, was expressed in declarations,
statements, public letters and meetings in which the Church or its members expressed
changes or reaffirmations in their positions. Most of the time, those discursive
performances had the government as the clear interlocutor and not a few times were a
reaction against symbolic or real acts of violence against the Church. These acts of
violence were also determinants, though secondarily, of the American interests, and
consisted, in general, of arrests, expulsions of foreign priests, torture, raids and
accusations of subversion among others. Concomitant with that interest in the Church’s
relation with the public realm, there was an interest in the internal affairs of the Church,
the changes in its internal balance of power, and its relations with other sectors of the
society, such as students.
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The gaps and periods of low circulation of cables cannot be simply explained as
decreases in the relevance of the Church. Certainly, during the periods in which the
Church-state conflict abated, the frequency of the cables lowered considerably. But there
exists significant periods of total Church cable absence in circumstances when important
events were taking place. How to explain, for instance, the absence of cables between
September of 1966 and February of 1968? During that eighteen months long period, Dom
Hélder made sympathetic declarations towards Cuba, the military arrested eleven
Benedictine monks for helping the students of the UNE to have their XXIX congress and
Dom Waldyr Calheiros, bishop of Volta Redonda, started his struggle for human rights,
which would eventually make him a frequent target of military repression.72
It has to be taken into account that during those years, there were other political
conflicts that included unions, students, parties and different levels of the government in
which the Church was not involved. Those events and crisis would momentarily distract
the attention of the American officials from the Church. In history, even the silence
speaks. The U.S. interest in the Brazilian Church is not only informed by what the cables
say but also by what they do not. Some meaningful elements about those silences will
gradually appear along these pages. Yet, bearing in mind the multiplicity of the factors
that could help to explain the absence of information in the cables about specific events, a
generalizing explanation in this regards would be too risky. Finally, there is still an
important number of classified cables as well as information in other collections to which
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we did not have access; such is the case of the archives of the CIA and other classified
documents.
The Dangerous Church
I have pointed out in the previous chapter that the Doctrine of National Security
and the Cuban Revolution had produced an atmosphere of political polarization during
the first half of the 1960s. In Brazil, the progressive wing of the Catholic Church was
commonly accused of political radicalism and proximity to “dangerous” groups.73
Accusations centered on the leaders of the Movement for Basic Education, foreign
priests, and progressive bishops like Dom Hélder Câmara, but particularly on student
organizations and clergymen involved or supportive with them.
In the same way, the concerns of the U.S. diplomatic mission in Brazil went along
the lines of McCarthyism. A cable of January 3 of 1964 from Rio de Janeiro with copy to
the embassy in Rome reported the spread, during the previous month, of a draft letter in
which the CNBB strongly warned Catholic Action and its secretary bishop, Dom
Cândido Padim, of any involvement in politics, and condemned any deviation from
Christian dogma. It was one more try of the Catholic hierarchy to distance the Catholic
University Youth from the Popular Action (AP) which did not represent the “authentic
Christian thought.”74
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The cable celebrates that the Church “has decided that cooperation with the
Marxist, theoretically non-Communist Popular Action is more likely to aid Communism
than the Church.”75 The comment contains some elements that characterized the
American view on the Church during those years. National Security Doctrine combines a
paternalistic discourse that negates the moral agency of most of the people and a
Manichean view of the world as ultimately divided between communism and evil on one
hand and capitalist democracy and goodness on the other. The Church is regarded, in a
broad sense, as a naïve institution and a vehicle of communists, extremists or terrorists
who are malicious enough to deceive and manipulate unwary people to their own ends. In
this way, the old uneducated bishops, the young and pious priests would almost
unconsciously be makers of the national debacle in Brazil. Therefore, the Church was
suspicious.
The National Security Doctrine had similar understandings of the students. They,
young and inexperienced, were as easy prey as the priests for the machinations of the
obscure forces of communism and terrorism. Here, communism and terrorism were
abstractions that played the role of the enemy in the discursive war. In the real war, which
used electric shocks and the Nazi tactics of night and fog, the enemies were students,
priests and other organic parts of society that would not easily be targeted in the
discourse without causing mental resistance in the majority of the people. This linguistic
strategy transformed the most progressive sectors of society into dupes at the service of
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hidden forces. A concomitant linguistic step transformed the naïve dupes into dangerous
suspects. In the dirty war of the 1960s and 1970s, “suspect” usually meant guilty.
Another cable of January of 1964 expands the information of the first in regards
to the connections of the Church with the AP. In this communication, Robert Dean,
counselor of the embassy, recognizes the role of the Church in the modernization of
Brazil and points out that some of its elements support and participate in the “negative
left.”76 Dean depicts the MBE as subverted by extremists and repeats the words of
Brazilian intellectual Erico Verissimo, for whom the National Union of Students (UNE)
is “an alliance of the Church with the Communists.”77 Farther on in the same text, Dean
expresses concern that the draft letter that condemns the AP would not have the approval
of the majority in the Church because of internal divisions.
The U.S. was attentive to the Church’s reception of the military regime from the
very beginning. 26 members of the CNBB met on May 27 of 1964 to have a two day long
discussion on the Church’s position in regards to the coup. An official statement was
released on June 2. In the declaration, the bishops expressed gratitude and praised the
military for their heroic role in the struggle against communism. Furthermore, the
episcopate made a mea culpa in which recognized the presence in its lines of “victims of
their own idealism.” The bishops were referring directly to the most progressive sectors
of the Church in the same paternalistic way of National Security.
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Nonetheless, at the same time the episcopate expressed uneasiness for the already
evident hostilities against the Church and rejected the generalizing accusations of
communism against Catholic Action and the MEB. Farther on, the bishops made
statements of support for democracy, dialogue and other generalities. One week later in a
cable, the most independent and critical parts of the episcopal document were observed
with irony: “The bishops also chose to lecture the revolutionary leaders on the urgent
need for reforms based on “the social doctrine of the church”.”78
The cable also highlights the agreement between the contrasted currents inside the
Church, pointing out that for the first time in recent history the progressive Dom Hélder
and the conservative Dom Jaime de Barros Câmara together signed an episcopal
document.79 For Charles Antoine, the declaration of June 2 was the consequence of a
“laborious compromise” between supporters of the regime and defenders of social
justice.80 The plurality of the opinions present in the document, on the other hand, may
have counted for the wide support it received in the episcopate.
After the coup, the military unleashed a political repression directed mostly at
political institutions, universities and the Church.81 The repression was carried out
through public accusations, detentions, raids, intimidations etc. Within the Church, the
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MEB and the Catholic University Youth, the most progressive structures, were the most
affected. Since the MEB was dependent on the support of the state, by removing the
institutional support the military were able to weaken it badly. It would require more
energy and time from the repressive apparatus to affect the Catholic students.
Four months after the coup, the Foreign Service reported about a document
entitled “Misery in Latin America: Fate or wrong-doing?” This document, issued by the
Catholic students and directed to the priests meeting in the Vatican Council, was
catalogued by the U.S. officers as “nationalist and anti-American propaganda.” The
document, which dealt with economic and social problems of the time, contained
dangerous postures: “The falling prices of raw materials, the rise in cost of manufactured
goods, U.S.-tied procurement – all the old and often-disproved charges – are used as
points of attack on the U.S. for “economic injustice”.” The silence of the social
movement after the first wave of military repression had not lasted too long; now, the
American officers were setting off alarms about the reappearance and reorganization of
“leftist Catholic groups” that were becoming “vocal” and “dangerous” again.82
During those first days of August of 1964, Ambassador Gordon paid a courtesy
call on the recently appointed Papal Nuncio, Sebastiano Baggio. Gordon expressed
special interest in the positions the Nuncio would take in regards to the student
movement, Catholic Rural Unionism and the MEB. If the call had the purpose of
assessing the proclivity of the new Nuncio to help the American interests, the results
were ambiguous. The Nuncio indicated “keen interest in the idea of cooperating with the
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United States Embassy in both the labor and student fields.” Nonetheless, Baggio let the
ambassador know that he did not share the Manichean attitude of the military that “were
unable to distinguish between serious cases of Communist loyalties and mere
progressivism.”83
The activities of the Catholic Youth were still an important concern for the U.S.
diplomatic services more than one year after the coup. On May 18 of 1965, Harold M.
Midkiff, U.S. Consul in Salvador, visited bishop Dom Eugênio Araújo Sales in his office.
In the subsequent conversation, the bishop talked openly about his policies in the
archdiocese and the Consul showed interest in the links of the Church with the AP and
the students in general. Midkiff made reference to Dom Jerônimo de Sá Cavalcante of the
São Bento Monastery in Salvador who, as a result of his proximity to the student
movement of Bahia, was seen with suspicion by the military, a suspicion that was shared
with the consulate.84
A cable of May 13 of 1965 expounded the life, career and ideas of Dom
Jerônimo, who was described as a very progressive man, close to Dom Hélder and with
an enormous influence on the youth: “It seems likely that Dom Jerônimo [sic] will have
increasing scope for his social reform ideas now that Dom Eugênio Sales has taken over
the administration of the Salvador Archdiocese. His influence on young people seems
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certain to be a positive force for developing an alightened [sic] Catholic leadership in the
Salvador area.”85
The Conflict Begins
Gradually, as the military unveiled their socioeconomic policies and it became
evident that their strength was brute force, a public confrontation between Catholic
progressivism and the military arose. The center of the conflict was the Catholic Action,
whose members, favorite targets of the repression, were highly critical of the
socioeconomic direction of the country. The American cables of the time, though very
attentive to the Church-state emerging confrontation and to any criticism towards the
regime, did not show the same interest in the political persecution and the
authoritarianism of the regime.
A cable of June 29, 1965 reported the release of a “manifesto” by the Worker
Catholic Action (Ação Católica Operária, ACO) of São Paulo that denounced the
situation of unemployment in that city. A few days later, Cardinal Dom Agnelo Rossi
made a statement that “removed much of the ammunition from the hands of those who
could have used the ACO manifesto against the government.” The cable also reported the
arrest and mistreatment of a priest and two students in the town of Goias Velho during a
protest: “Although physical punishment [italics added] was employed, there is no
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evidence of any anti-Church campaign.”86 Evidently, in the cable the repressive violence
is almost disregarded whereas the main concern is the respectability of the regime.
The cable described other skirmishes, suggesting that “leftist press,” such as the
journal Ultima Hora, had enormous responsibility in stirring up Church-state conflict.
The cable criticized Ultima Hora for using words like “torture” and “persecution” in its
headlines. For the reporting officer, the “alleged coolness” between the two institutions
was little more than a creation of tendentious leftist press. The most remarkable element
in the situation was how that alleged conflict was to be used in “anti-government
attacks.” In sum, the American view of Church-state relations was a total identification
with the preoccupations of the regime itself: no real concern for freedom, democracy or
the rule of law, but about the political cost to the military regime of a conflict with the
Church.
Church-state relations and the activities of the Catholic youth were still the main
concern of the U.S. officers by mid-1966. The students, clandestinely organized around
the UNE, were re-strengthening politically and demanding the support of the episcopate.
Most of the bishops were more focused on maintaining stable relations with the regime
and were doing anything possible to cut off institutional ties with the students. But the
progressives understood their support to the youth as a duty and were ready to assist
them.87
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In July, when the UNE had its national congress in Belo Horizonte, the religious
orders took measures to protect them from state repression and let the students use the
convents to carry on the meeting. Meanwhile, the bishops of the Northeast, headed by
Dom Hélder Câmara, gave clear indications of their support to the progressive lay basis
by endorsing two documents of the Workers Catholic Action ACO of Recife and the
Catholic Agrarian Youth (Juventude Agrária Católica, JAC). The documents consisted of
analysis of the socioeconomic situation of the northeastern peasants and workers that
implied criticisms of the status quo. The final document, with the approval of the
bishops, came to be known as the “Manifesto of the Bishops of the Northeast.”88
All of this unleashed the rage of the military that intensified its repression and
made of bishop Dom Hélder Câmara an object of bitter criticisms and black propaganda.
Church-state relations had reached its lowest point thus far. In those days, as the
episcopate showed support for the bishop, the high military circles moved towards
conciliation. In August, the president, Castelo Branco himself, met with Dom Hélder in
Recife and silenced the enemies that the bishop had among the military of the Northeast.
The American diplomatics regarded the protection of the students in Belo
Horizonte and the manifesto of the bishops as “examples of the increasing activity of the
Church in Brazilian political affairs.”89 The lack of historical perspective of the Foreign
Service is noteworthy. As was made clear in the previous chapter, the Church had been
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involved in political affairs for decades. The difference was that by 1966 there was a
sector that had adopted a critical distance from the de facto government.
The Church-state conflict was the center of attention for the American Foreign
Service in Brazil by mid-1966.90 In the U.S. view, the heart of the matter was the
attention the conflict had in the media. Furthermore, Dom Hélder and his supporters in
the episcopate were depicted as belligerents, who kept the scandal alive with new
statements and declarations. The apparent American concern about the press coverage of
these conflicts was actually a real concern for the stability of the regime: “What began as
a relatively mild protest over conditions in the Northeast has by inept local military action
and inadequate defensive measures on the national level been blown up far beyond its
real importance. The opposition has naturally made the most of it.”91
Interestingly enough, American concern for the fate of the regime led the
consulate to regard not only the Church but the military themselves as a threat to the
regime. During all the period that this study covers, a sort of disenchantment of the
Americans with the Brazilian military occasionally surfaces. For the U.S., the Brazilian
military were incapable of dealing with certain problems and at times their ineptitude
contributed to worsen the conflict. That perception was inherent to the paternalistic
character of the National Security Doctrine and other historical relation of the U.S. with
the world.
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The Church and Students
During 1968, the coolness and skirmishes of previous years degenerated into open
conflict between the Church and state. In consequence, the number of cables grew in
comparison to the previous years. Moreover, in 1968 the progressive bishops, particularly
the northeasterners, became more critical of the socioeconomic problems of Brazil and
opted decisively for protecting the students from the state repression.
If the U.S. officers regarded the Brazilian military as inept, the events of 1968
would prove them right. On March 28, a young student, Edson Luis de Lima Souto, was
killed by the military police during a demonstration in Rio de Janeiro. This provoked the
indignation of the students, who, with wide support from the masses, started a year of
tireless mobilizations that would make the government tremble. The U.S. was attentive to
the situation of the students and their links with the Church.92 In June of 1968, a cable
from the Consulate General in Recife about a “Church-student alliance in the Northeast”
read:
There is growing evidence that the Church in the Northeast is moving toward closer identification
with student activists. In the past six weeks no less than five leading churchmen have by word and
deed demonstrated their support for reform-minded university students. While most of the prelates
involved are associated with the “progressive” wing of the Church which has frequently been out
of step with the rest of the Church hierarchy, they in this instance at least, are believed to reflect
the feelings of a growing cross section of their fellow churchmen.93
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Certainly, the Church of the Northeast strongly supported the students; Dom
Antonio Batista Fragoso, Dom Hélder, Dom Fernando Gomes, and Dom José Medeiros
Delgado had moved vehemently in that direction. As a result of the progressive
inclinations of the Northeastern bishops, they were usually objects of keen observation by
the American diplomats. It is worth noting the perception of growing unity in the Church
that the U.S. had by 1968 as a result of the support for the students.
Had such unity truly been the case, it would very soon be called into question. On
June 10, the Recife city councilman Wandenkolk Wanderley, probably the most fervent
opponent of Dom Hélder Câmara in the Northeast, released the contents of a study by the
Belgian priest Joseph Comblin, who belonged to the circle of the bishop. The study about
the socioeconomic problems of Latin America was meant to be presented in the General
Assembly of the Latin American Episcopal Conference (Conferencia Episcopal
Latinoamericana, CELAM) to be held in Medellin that August.
The Consulate in Recife regarded the document as subversive and inflammatory
for claiming the need for a radical change in the socioeconomic structures of Latin
America. Of particular concern were the Comblin’s criticisms of the U.S.: “The
document, he [Wanderley] pointed out, made no reference to oppression in the Soviet
Union and warmly praised the Cuban revolution while criticizing the governments of
Portugal, Spain and the United States. In short, Wanderley concluded, the document
opposed all those who combat communism.”94
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Furthermore, the cable described the controversy ignited in the press by the
document and judged that the support for Dom Hélder in public opinion had been
seriously affected. However, at the same time, the cable acknowledges that “Most
responsible Northeasterners have fortunately learned to discount attacks upon Dom
Hélder from the likes of Wanderley and his colleagues.”95 Some weeks later, as Tradição,
Família e Propriedade attacked Dom Hélder, a cable from the Consulate in Recife
maintained that the ultra-right group attracted people of the sort of Wanderley, who was
discredited in public opinion for his “almost pathological attacks” against the bishop.96
This cable shows how, in spite of some proximity, the U.S. services preserved some
distance from the traditional right wing of Brazil.
The year of 1968 was key for progressive Catholicism and for the student
movement in Brazil. During the conference of the Latin American episcopate in
Medellin, the most progressive bishops, led by the Brazilians, were able to give to the
Church its most revolutionary push. In the conclusions of Medellin, the bishops used
Cardijn’s “revision of life” method to understand the Latin American reality and made a
commitment for social change. For many observers this was the official birth certificate
of the Liberationist Christianity; the progressivist movement was living a moment of
hope. Bishops, foreign worker priests and lay people involved in Catholic Action would
preach openly the need for social change and requested the participation of the people of
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God in the process. For most of them, this was not much more than the adaptation of the
Vatican Council to the Latin American reality.
On the other hand, besides the indignation over the death of Edson Luis, the
student unrest of 1968 contained further implications. Popular mobilizations in many
parts of the world were taking place and the revolutionary movements displayed
enormous ability to summon the masses. People went massively to the streets in the U.S.,
Japan, France, Mexico and the Southern Cone, just to mention a few cases. Consequently,
the reactionary forces counterattacked with violence; in the U.S., Martin Luther King was
assassinated and in Mexico the government perpetrated the Tlatelolco Massacre. In
Brazil, the support of an important sector of the Church for the student movement led to a
spiral of deterioration in Church-state relations during the second half of the year.
The military regime, stunned by the popular unrest and the loss of support in the
remaining political institutions, was moving towards an even more repressive policy.
Arrests and persecutions were running continuously, which exacerbated the demands for
democracy and social change, ergo: the mobilizations in the streets. The military rage
against progressive Catholics was not always able to distinguish the political position of
individuals. Therefore, the arrests and accusations of subversion and communism in some
instances ended up affecting moderate and even conservative churchmen. The offended
bishops, who denounced the persecution and protested the McCarthyism, were gaining
the support of most of the hierarchy. Even though they reacted as individuals and leaders
of their dioceses, the less lucid of the military saw an enemy in the Church as a whole.
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The repressive apparatus, outraged by the Comblin affair, started targeting a
particularly vulnerable sector of the progressive Catholicism: the foreign priests. In
November 29, three French Assumptionist priests, a few Brazilian churchmen and lay
people were arrested in Belo Horizonte. Until they were set free in February of 1969, the
regime continuously threated to expel them. As a consequence of the progressive line of a
good part of the foreign clergy, they were a natural target for the military. Moreover,
taking into account the Church’s dependency on the foreigners, for the bishops a threat to
them was a threat to the functioning of the Church itself. The U.S. diplomats assessed
that whether the government was to “employ expulsion as a routine device to dispense
with foreign ecclesiastics who express public opposition to it,” the strategy would
produce very different outcomes:97
Rather than voluntarily restrain themselves in the face of possible expulsion or intimidation by the
Government, or msek [sic] advice from some bishops, there is every reason to project that such
foreign progressives would actively seek to challenge to GOB outright with the intention of
provoking a Church-State showdown. Should such defiance occur, foreign priests would certainly
be supported by liberal activists among the Brazilian clergy, such as the Dominicans who have
been in the vanguard of most anti-Government actions by the clergy.98

This report calls attention to the fact that, for the U.S., the foreign priests were
radicals who deliberately resorted to provocation to foster Church-state crisis. Even more,
the consequent and anticipated repression would be opportunistically used to reinforce
the opposition to the regime. Again, in the short term, the repressive policy of the military
97
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in this regard was not just ineffective but counterproductive; it was a factor producing
unity in the Church. Even the conservative Dom Jaime de Barros Câmara had resented
the government’s threat to summarily expel the Assumptionists.99
A Turning Point
The unceasing student mobilization protected by the progressive Catholics,
growing discontent with the government in political circles and ideological polarization
were jointly undermining the regime. In the always difficult balance of power among the
different factions within the military, the most authoritarian sectors were strengthening.
In December 13 of 1968, they forced the Institutional Act Number 5 (Ato Institucional 5,
AI5) that initiated the most severe years of repression.
The AI5 dismantled the few remnant political structures that the dictatorship had
not dissolved in order to maintain a democratic façade. The military concentrated its
power in a small circle, stiffened censorship, prohibited any expression of discontent,
restricted civil liberties and gave unprecedented powers to the repressive apparatus. As
the regime made a leap towards a state of terror in which torture, murder and
disappearance of dissidents became massive, Brazil’s hopes for a quick return to
democracy faded away.100
The AI5 brought some slight variations to the U.S.-Brazil relations. As a matter of
fact, although the American position towards Brazilian repression was generally one of
complicity, some reservations had never been absent. American diplomats had
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disdainfully observed the tactlessness of the Brazilian military since the very
beginning.101 To them, the hardening of the authoritarian character of the regime was also
a consequence of the military’s ineptitude.
Moreover, the increase of the repressive policies was badly received by the
international press. It became increasingly difficult for the U.S. to justify its
unconditional support for an intolerant regime that systematically tortured its citizens.102
Emergent international networks of opposition to the dictatorship were taking shape. In
the U.S., Brazilian exiles, brazilianist scholars, the Catholic Church and American
Protestant churches began a campaign of denunciation of the repression and increased
pressure in public opinion to make Washington change its policy of complicity.
To complicate the situation, on December 15, two days after the imposition of the
AI5, Darrel Rupiper and Peter Grams, two American Oblates linked to Dom Hélder were
arrested in Recife. Following the habitual pattern of state persecution, the priests were
accused of subversion and faced military trial. With the involvement of the embassy on
their behalf, the priests accepted “voluntary expulsion” and left the country by Christmas.
During their time in the hands of the military the priests could hear the screams of the
tortured prisoners. When they landed back in the U.S., they were a living testimony of the
human rights violations in Brazil. 103
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In spite of all, the Brazilian regime was a natural ally of the U.S.; any change in
the American attitude towards the military would therefore occur with subtleness: “The
tightrope maneuvering that State Department officials recommended entailed discreetly
trying to convince sectors of the Brazilian military to moderate their measures so that the
political situation would not place the U.S. government in the position of having to
distance itself from the regime.”104 The State Department judged that either distancing
itself from the Brazilian military or exerting too much pressure on it would make the
military adopt an isolationist nationalist attitude. The visit of Rockefeller to Brazil next
June was to be a sign of American support for the Brazilian government.
The progressive Catholics had some hopes for a decisive shift in the U.S. posture.
Facing the enormous limitations on free speech in Brazil and the hardening of the
repression, the bishops were increasingly resorting to the international community to
denounce human rights violations. For obvious reasons, the first likely ally was the
Vatican. At the end of January of 1969, during a conversation between Dom José de
Medeiros Delgado, archbishop of Fortaleza and the political officer Richard H. Melton,
the former stated that the Pope and the Vatican were aware of the situation in Brazil and
that they fully supported the Brazilian hierarchy.105 As we will see, during the next
months and years the Vatican would play an increasingly important role in the Church’s
defense of human rights in Brazil.
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The bishop made other important comments during that conversation. He
basically showed hopes that the United States would speak out against the deepening of
the repression and would align on the side of human rights and dignity. Nonetheless,
Dom Medeiros seemed aware that any move by the U.S. government would be very
subtle. He was probably thinking that any shift in the U.S. policy would be very unlikely
under the new administration of Richard Nixon (1969-1974). That was essentially what
Cardinal Dom Agnelo Rossi said to the American Consulate of São Paulo in February.
Rossi had fewer expectations than Medeiros; he expected from the U.S. only the
moderate and friendly advice of a father:
Rossi commented that many Brazilians thought President Nixon’s election raised hope in
Brazilian military men that U.S. would be more tolerant to authoritarian conservative regimes in
Latin America. Some Brazilians even blamed “imperialist” U.S. for inspiring IA-5. In response
question Rossi replied USG should express to GOB private concern as friend over events in Brazil
and hope country would soon return democratic path.106

For the progressive churchmen, the first five years of the dictatorship had
produced a government against social change that was also repressive. After the AI5, the
regime was mainly regarded as an enormous repressive apparatus. This affected their
view of the U.S., which for them, would eventually be no longer the imperialist country
that supported the regime but a hopeful landscape with an emergent movement for the
defense of human rights whose government could have a real influence in the human
rights policy of the dictatorship.
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A Modern Martyrology
The AI5 was in some ways a coup within the coup, a victory of the authoritarian
faction over the moderates of the military.107 As in the events of 1964, the U.S. was
highly interested in the official position of the Church. As a first reaction, the leaders of
the Church had ceased to refer openly to the situation and took the AI5 as a fact with no
chance for a quick reversal. Although most of them totally rejected the AI5, their attitude
was of openness to dialogue and collaboration with the government. They were giving
the government the benefit of the doubt in regards to the AI5. The Diocese of Guanabara,
in particular, was striving for dialogue with the government in order to appease the
tensions that had been accumulating since 1964 and that exploded in 1968. At the bottom,
the U.S. Service read in the attitude of the bishops a pessimistic assessment of the
situation and a readiness to oppose the government at any moment.108
The Church wanted to be united behind any measure they may take. The previous
year had been marked by a relation with the government through individual actions and
statements. For the year of 1969, the bishops judged, facing a more authoritarian state,
individual opposition would only lead to more repression. The Church’s struggle for one
institutional posture in regards to the regime would take the remaining years of the 19641972 period. Based on the information the U.S. officers could obtain, they were under the
impression that the Church was moving towards a policy of support to those affected by
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repression but in a very conciliatory way.109 A glimpse of the Church’s attitude is the
comment of a reporting officer after a conversation with the leaders of the Church in Belo
Horizonte that, as a result of the case of the French Assumptionists, was in the center of
the debate:
Belo [Horizonte] Church leaders regard the Church as the only national institution capable of
resisting the government and believe the Church must continue to work for social change in
Brazil. At the moment, however, they appear to have decided to play this role in a low-key
manner, believing that Church unity would be endangered and popular support lacking if they
attempted to actively confront the government in the spheres of political activity. This restraint
will end, however, if the government takes repressive measures against the Church or if the
government fails to find solutions to pressing national problems.110

At the request of the Northeastern bishops who had suffered the heaviest
repression, the Central Commission of the CNBB had an extraordinary meeting on
February to set its position towards the AI5.111 The resulting document resembled the one
of May of 1964 in comprising the broad plurality of the Church; it expressed deep
concern about the consequences the AI5 would have on the human rights situation of
Brazil and regretted the “existing misinterpretation and incomprehension concerning the
activities of the Church in our country, even if there has been imprudence—which we
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equally regret.”112 No less importantly, the bishops also expressed the need for redemocratization “as soon as possible.” At the same time, they diplomatically expressed
desire to collaborate with the government.113 In spite of the different elements of the
document and the myriad of likely interpretations, for the U.S., in some respects the
CNBB declaration was a truce.114
However, the situation in the Northeast was still worrisome. The clergy of that
region were particularly reluctant to overlook the social situation; ergo they kept being
targeted by military repression. Probably as a consequence of the military control of press
and media, the events of the Northeast were treated as a regional problem. One event that
did not remain in the Northeastern context but shocked the nation and had international
consequences was the torture and murder, on May 26 of 1969, of father Antônio
Henrique Pereira da Silva Neto.
The 28 year old priest was the cleric responsible for the Catholic University
Youth in Recife and worked very closely with Dom Hélder Câmara. Father Henrique had
replaced Luis de Sena and Almery Becerra, two Brazilian priests who had been forced to
leave the country as the regime issued death threats against the bishop and anyone who
worked with him. After the murder of Henrique, the authorities did their utmost to divert
the investigation and distract the public attention. In the communications of the Consulate
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in Recife about the crime, the U.S. diplomats show an almost nonexistent capacity to
distrust the diverting thesis of the authorities that very quickly presented the murder as a
crime of passion:
Thus far there is no firm evidence indicating who responsible for murder. Speculation in Church
and university circles is that Communist Hunters Command (CHC), right-wing terrorist
organization is responsible. Police sources, however, say privately it probably “crime of passion”
with no political motivation. Recife press, operating under self-censorship gives scant attention to
murder which covered on inside crime pages by short factual account supplied by police.115

It is worth noting how in the cable the ideology and alignment with the regime is
shrouded with an aura of objectivity. The reporting officer does not only overlook the
whole context of persecution and repression but does not show the minimum critical
distance from the official version that heavily relied upon strict censorship. Even six
months later, when referring to the crime, the American cables would be faithful to the
variable official versions that by December suggested the crime had been committed by
“degenerate drug users.” The Consulate easily dismissed the indications of a political
crime as a consequence of “emotional suspicion” of the Church.116
For the U.S., the causes of the crime and its connections with a state of terror in
Brazil were not as important as its effect on public opinion and the strain it could bring to
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the Church-state relations.117 There was also concern for an intensification of Dom
Hélder’s denunciations against the government. Two days after the crime, the comment
of a telegram read: “Dom Hélder likely to regard incident as consistent with alleged
strategy to have him shifted by Church even if military authorities opposed to this sort of
terrorist action.”118 As in previous years, the American Foreign Service did not show any
interest in freedom, democracy nor the life those who opposed the dictatorship but in the
fate and stability of the regime.
The General Assembly of the CNBB in July of 1969 was expected to be a new
moment of definition of the Church regarding the political situation of the country. The
American officers were very interested in the possible outcomes of the meeting,
particularly in the position the Church would adopt in its relation with the government.119
The sources of the U.S. officers indicated that the Church would maintain its moderate
position.
The replacement of Nuncio Sebastiano Baggio with Umberto Mozzoni in June
had been interpreted as a conservative turn in the policy of the Vatican towards Brazil.
Baggio had been supportive with the progressives and the Brazilian government would
have exercised some pressure in Rome to have him out of the country. Mozzoni, on the
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other hand, was held as conservative.120 Another cable, of July also explored some
signals from the Vatican that led the American officers to think that Rome was inclined
to counterbalance the power of the Northeastern churchmen.121 In some way, the U.S.
officers were correct in their predictions. In spite of the murder of Father Henrique and
the escalation of the military repression, the Assembly did not end with a basic statement
about Church-state relations. The Church, if anything, maintained what seemed the
moderate position of February, an outcome that, in the opinion of the U.S., must have
seemed disappointing for the progressives.122
Collaboration for Social Change
The interest of the U.S. in the Catholic Church made a significant leap in the year
of 1969. Of the total of 167 documents and 552 pages for the 1964-1972 period, 61
documents and 249 pages are from 1969. As a consequence of the issuance of the AI5,
that was a very intense year, full of skirmishes and confrontations. Moreover, 1969
started a very slow process of change in the American interest in the Church; a process
that continued at least until 1972, the limit of this study.
The cautious position of the hierarchy after the AI5 contributed to the shift in the
American view of the Church. Not a little contributed to the shift in the American view of
the Church the moderate position of the hierarchy after the AI5. The spirit of that posture
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was deeply expressed in the conciliatory statement of February and the lack of any
statement regarding Church-state relations in the General Assembly of July. Taking into
account the previous American preoccupation with the disruption that the Church-state
conflict brought to the regime, that new attitude (easily comprehensible on the other
hand, bearing in mind the few options of the Catholic hierarchy) meant good news for the
United States.
A conversation between Cardinal Dom Agnelo Rossi and officers of the
Consulate in São Paulo following the CNBB meeting of February helps to understand
some elements of the shift in the American view by 1969. In the conversation, the
Cardinal expressed his preference for a “middle-of-the-road position” of the Church in
regards to the regime. He criticized Dom Hélder for “provoking” the government and for
his inappropriate criticisms of capitalism and U.S. policy. At the same time, the prelate
expressed disagreement with the conservatives in the Church who favored the hardline
military “one-hundred-percent.”123
Rossi said that he had opposed those who, in the meeting of February, wanted a
stronger position of the Church regarding the AI5. In his opinion, that attitude would
exacerbate the situation and the Church would lose capacity of influence over the regime.
More interestingly, Rossi “appeared confident that the U.S. Government authorities
would also find the message an excellent one with which we could agree.” The attitude of
Rossi, though conciliatory and moderate, was also characterized by a strong spirit de
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corps. He had refused the National Order of Merit Medal the generals had awarded him
with in order to “preserve his independence of [sic] the government.”124
The primary element of the emerging American rapprochement to the Church was
a systematic effort to know it more deeply. During 1969 the Church, not only in Brazil
but in Latin America in general, was the object of close observation as indicates a cable
from the State Department on April of that year that deals with a systematic “intelligence
estimate” on the Church. The cable asked the U.S. missions in Latin American countries
for contributions to the study:
In particular, our interest is so far focused upon 1 the internal structure of the Church, [underlined
in the original] its various factions and leaders as they relate to the problems of social, economic,
and political development; 2 the social doctrines of the Church as they are interpreted by the Latin
clergy, and particularly as they relate to reform, the development process, and violence as a means
to achieve change; and 3 the alliances and relations with other groups, such as political parties,
labor organizations, youth groups, and the military. We hope to reach some conclusions on the
political and social significance of the Church in Latin America and the ways in which it is a force
for and against various kinds of development there.125

This cable can be taken as a point of convergence of different American views of
the Church. On one hand, the logics of the National Security Doctrine are still present,
particularly in the second point that suggests likely inclinations of the churchmen to the
use of violence. But the Church is also seen here as an agent of development and
consequently a likely ally of the United States. That view of the Church would be
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recurrent in the next months and years and gradually diminished the vehemence of the
National Security ideology in the cables.
Beyond any ideological position of the State Department, what is clear is that
there was a deep interest in the Catholic Church, regarded as an actor of major relevance
and influence in Latin American politics. This perception was the consequence of the
intense political participation of the Church in 1968 and 1969. All four major reports (the
most complete, deeply thought and best structured type of cable) for the whole 19641972 period were issued in mid-1969.126 Two of them dealt exclusively with the Church
in the Northeast. It should be clear by now the reasons for the American special interest
in the Church of that region.
A first report, 11 page long and entitled “Consulate General Seeks Broadened
Dialogue with Northeast Churchmen,” was issued in Recife on July 30 of 1969.127 The
general framework of the cable was the need of the U.S. to seek dialogue with sectors
disposed to and capable of social change in the Northeast. The military and the economic
elites were major forces but the cable judged them unlikely to be inclined to social
change. Since the issuance of the AI5 the political class of the region had been affected
by cassation and cast out from the exercise of power, the students had been hit by
punitive actions, organized labor was weak and divided, and the communications media
had been censored.

126

See the classification of the cables in the second chapter.

127

Report, Recife, July 30, 1969, State Department Cables, U.S. Embassy, Brasilia, National Archives, box
33.

78

Thus, the Church emerged as the most important actor for social change in the
Northeast “simply by the process of elimination.” The report advocated for “priority
attention” to the Northeastern Church “both as a potential important political force
affecting Brazil’s future and as a potential agent for significant social change.” But the
cable also considered positively other elements (elements that had been judged
unfavorably in the previous years) for the need of an intense U.S.-Church collaboration.
The cable dealt with the involvement of the Church in social change, the general
criticisms among the churchmen of the U.S. policies and the situation of American
clergymen in Brazil. In a pragmatic way, the cable asserts: “Despite outward
appearances, we have found many churchmen willing and even eager to engage in
meaningful dialogue, and some to be susceptible to influence. […] The extensive links of
churchmen through the region, within Brazil, and abroad, not only give our efforts here a
potentially large multiplier effect, but it may also open alternative avenues of approach to
this group.” The State Department wanted to use the strengths of the Church to penetrate
Brazilian society.
The report explained some approaches to Catholic and Protestant leaders in the
Northeast, pointing out the reservations of the progressives but also their willingness to
collaborate with the U.S. Out of the meetings with the religious leaders of the Northeast,
which included the conspicuous Hélder Câmara and several American priests and
missionaries, emerged the “subject of the preparation and training of churchmen and
women,” a subject that would grow in importance during the next weeks.
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A 17 page long cable was issued on August 22 also from Recife. It was the first
part of a twofold report that, as a whole, dealt with the religious actors of the Northeast.
The first was devoted to the Catholic Church and the second to other religious actors.
This cable follows closely the guidelines of the cable from Washington of April (see note
115) and described the relevance of the Church in the Northeast, its conflicts with the
military, its inner debates, its finances, the functioning of the institutional structure and
the relation with other sectors. The cable still shows the sort of concern characteristic of
the National Security Doctrine:
Radicals and some progressives, among the Northeast clergy are not completely intimidated,
moreover, by the Church’s theoretical rejection of violence. Rather, they tend to give some degree
of acceptance to the counter-argument that institutionalized violence already exists, and that by
taking arms the people would be really acting only in self-defense. Dom Fragoso, Archbishop José
Maria Pires of João Pessoa, and even Dom Hélder himself, have indicated varying degrees of
sympathy with this line of argument.128

Nonetheless, this cable, as the previous major report, also depicted the Church in
the Northeast mainly as an “institutionalized force for modernization of the economic and
social structure which is essential to development in the Northeast.” A most important
element of this report is the focus on all the aspects related to priesthood. It delved into
the “crisis in the recruitment of priests,” the consequent relevance of the foreign clergy,
and even the political postures of the priests according to their nationalities.
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For obvious reasons, the interest augmented when it came to American clergy.
The cable concluded that the American priests were neither as traditionalist as Italians,
Portuguese and Brazilians nor as radical and compromised as the Dutch and Germans.
American clergy would follow a rather Protestant-like line that encouraged participation
of laity and “get close to the people at the lowest economic and social levels.” American
officers seemed interested in reaching those levels of Brazilian society.
A third major report came in September but this one broadened the perspective
from the Northeast to the whole country. The cable of 27 pages was signed by
Ambassador Charles Elbrick who had replaced John W. Tuthill in March of 1969.129 The
report went along the same lines of the previous two, focusing on institutional
information such as “the native and foreign priesthood, recruitment of priests, Church
attendance, the role of the laity, current church educational and labor policies, the
ecumenical movement and its radical tendency.”130
Moreover, this cable stressed some elements that had been emerging in the
previous reports, namely the crisis of vocations to the priesthood, the situation of foreign
priests and the diverse elements of clergy recruitment. The U.S. had noted that by the end
of the 1960s, one of the biggest problems of the Brazilian Church was the massive
abandonment of priesthood, particularly by young and progressive priests, who were
feeling frustrated by the difficulties in implementing the reforms of the Council.
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On the other hand, during 1969, after the scandal around Father Comblin’s study,
and particularly after the expulsion of the Oblates, foreign priests, particularly the
Americans, demanded the attention of the U.S.131 In several cables, the Foreign Service
provided quantitative and qualitative information as queried by Washington.132 A cable of
June, for instance, as a response to the instructions of the CIA, provided detailed
information about the ideological postures of foreign clergymen who would be “pushing
too hard for social and economic reforms.” The cable also dealt with the attitudes of the
Brazilian priests towards their fellow American churchmen. In their answer, the
American diplomats drew the panorama of the different political postures and approaches
to social reality in accordance to the nationality of the priests. Yet, at the same time, the
cable showed sincere concerns about the security of the American priests in Brazil.133
A fourth major report, issued in Recife on October, should help to understand
how the American interests in the crisis of priesthood, the situation of the foreign priests
and the diverse elements of clergy recruitment are connected. On the basis of the
perception of the Church’s “significant potential as an agent of development and social
change,” and taking into account “the many setbacks and frustrations which individual
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clergymen endure in their difficult and frequently misunderstood social-action oriented
pastoral activities,” the cable outlined a likely U.S.-Church cooperation.134
The cooperation would consist of American assistance in the training of priests,
foreign or Brazilians, in order to strengthen “the ability of the Catholic and other
Churches in Brazil to contribute to development.” The report proposes a few likely
programs and explores the ways to make them possible. Not only the U.S. and the
Brazilian Catholic Church would participate in the programs but also the American
Catholic Church, universities and institutions such as the Center for Inter-Cultural
Formation (Centro de Formação Intercultural, CENFI) in which foreign churchmen,
diplomats and lay people were oriented when arriving to Brazil. According to the cable,
American officers had been consulting with the religious leaders of the Northeast for the
formulation of these plans.
In perspective, the proposal was the outcome of that systematic effort at gathering
information about the Church in 1969. Clearly, the increasing interest of the State
Department and other agencies in the situation of the foreign clergy and the priesthood
crisis was pragmatic. The crisis of the Church meant an opportunity for the U.S. that saw
the American religious missions in Brazil as an opportunity to penetrate and influence the
Church.
Gradually, after 1969 the suspicion towards the Church that was so evident in the
cables of the first five years of dictatorship became less vehement. The Church was
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increasingly seen as an agent with an enormous capacity for social change and less as a
threat to the stability of the regime. The language of National Security was giving room
to a spirit of collaboration for social change and modernization.
In all these major cables of 1969, the American officers constantly mentioned the
criticisms of the progressive Northeastern churchmen of the U.S. Even though the
hierarchy had some hopes in a likely alignment of the American government with human
rights issues, the churchmen openly reproached the U.S. through the diplomatic officers.
This would also stimulate the desire to influence the Church in order to change the
negative image it had of the U.S.
In this regard, it is noteworthy that the new “collaboration for social change”
approach was focused on the Northeast, where the Church was more progressive and
likely to criticize the U.S. It could easily be interpreted that the American agencies were
trying to encourage their own view of social change in the Northeast in order to
counteract the relevance of the most progressive views;
The collaborationist view of the Church emerged in the aftermath of the AI5 and
the international concern for the human rights situation in Brazil. The aforementioned
subtle shift in the U.S. view of the regime had as a consequence an American
rapprochement to the democratic sectors of Brazil.135 Sooner or later, probably as a
consequence of international pressure, the military would go back to the barracks and
those sectors would take back the reins of the Brazilian state. Nevertheless, most of the
democratic opposition had gotten smashed by the repression. Unlike parties and
135
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collegiate bodies that depended on the state, the Church was not only independent but
rivaled it in political importance and social scope.
Therefore, although the lay organizations of the base and the Catholic press were
dismantled or silenced, the CNBB not only remained standing but was even gaining in
cohesion and international support. The deepening of the repression during 1968, the
threats against foreign priests and the issuance of the AI5 were awakening an
international consciousness. Furthermore, the Brazilian Church was getting the attention
of the Vatican and building fruitful relations with the American Catholic Church,
brazilianist scholars, the protestant churches and emergent organizations for the defense
of human rights. At least in the case of the Oblates, the U.S. could feel sympathy for the
persecuted and repressed of Brazil.
The Transformation of the Church
Still, during the second half of 1969 the U.S. officers kept reporting on situations
that affected Church-state relations. The most relevant of these events was the arrest and
torture of members of the Dominican order who were linked to leftist groups in arms.
Faithful to the posture adopted after the issuance of the AI5, the bishops refrained from
public and open confrontation with the military. Thus, these situations did not ignite the
public confrontation of other times. Although some U.S. officers understood the
“prudence” of the Church as a blow to the progressives, the Church was plainly not
accepting of the behavior of the military. A strong institutional discourse and praxis of
protection of human rights was emerging. Around human rights, the Brazilian Church
would reach its moment of greatest union and became the main opponent to the regime.
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The moderate attitude of the Church was tied to the growing leadership of Dom
Eugênio de Araújo Sales.136 Repression in Salvador had been fruitful in breaking the
student and lay movement that had maintained the Northeast as a fortress of the
liberationists. The appointment of Dom Eugênio as archbishop of Salvador in October of
1968 was seen by the U.S. as a blow to the progressivism in the Northeast and
particularly to that of the Benedictines of the São Bento Monastery.137 The U.S. officers
judged that with him in Salvador, Dom Timóteo Amoroso Anastácio and Dom Jerônimo
de Sá, largely regarded as controversial, would lose ground. However, by 1970 they were
still in the sights of the U.S. officers.138
Yet, the figure of Dom Eugênio was too complicated to fit into the
conservative/progressive scheme. As a matter of fact, the American cables of the time
contradicted each other by regarding him at times as conservative and at times as
progressive.139 What is clear is that Dom Eugênio was stamping a cautious attitude in the
Church in which there were strong criticisms against the government for human rights
violations though through institutional ways. “He [Eugênio] seemed especially interested
in trying to portray the Church and himself as vigorously involved in the struggle against
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torture, murder and other violations of personal liberties committed by police and other
security officials.”140
Broadly, that was the policy followed by the Central Commission of the CNBB in
the meeting of February of 1970. Then, the Church officially adopted the posture of low
key dialogue that had been striving to reach during one year. During 1970 the Church
was still the object of intense observation by the U.S. diplomatic corps. Although the flux
of cables lowered considerably in comparison to the previous year, 1970 was the second
most important year of the U.S. interest in the Brazilian Church for the 1964-1972 period,
with 42 documents and 110 pages.
For those who interpreted the new position of the Church as harmless to the state,
the annual Assembly of bishops on May of 1970 would prove them wrong. In that
meeting, the bishops continued to follow the policy of avoiding open confrontation but at
the same time they strongly repudiated the use of torture.141 The fact that the resulting
pastoral letter of the meeting, issued on May 27, included a statement that totally
condemned the human rights violations was an achievement in comparison to the lack of
agreement of the previous year.142
The outcome of the Assembly of May was a direct consequence of the systematic
persecution the Church had suffered since 1968 and the deepening of the repression after
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the AI5. On one hand, the repression was successfully undermining the grassroots that
constituted the support of the progressive bishops; in consequence, the conservatives
were having more room for manoeuver and were exerting considerable pressure on the
most outspoken progressives to stop their denunciations of the social calamities.
However, at the same time, most churchmen discerned that the persecution was
not limited to the progressive sector but it was directed to the Church as a whole. The
murder of father Henrique, but also the successful Assembly of CELAM awakened the
esprit de corps of the majority of the bishops, regardless of their political posture. Since
1969, those bishops commonly held as conservatives had been giving signals of
disappointment with the regime and the southern churchmen started supporting more
decisively the northeastern ones.
In January of 1969, for instance, the Foreign Service had noticed that Dom José
Lafaiette, auxiliary bishop of São Paulo, who was usually portrayed as conservative, was
“outraged” by the regime. Feeling that his Church was being seriously challenged, he
would “react vigorously.” The American officers noted that in this regard, his position
“appeared to differ very little from that of the progressive Dominicans.”143
Another cable, of February of 1970, described a very similar situation for
archbishop of Goiana, Dom Fernando Gomes dos Santos: “Having been the target of
criticism from the left wing prior to the revolution of 1964 he now finds himself equally
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critized [sic] by the group in power in 1970.”144 I have also mentioned how Dom Jaime
de Barros Câmara had resented the expulsion of the Assumptionists. Since 1969 he and
Dom Eugênio had become vocal in the defense of human rights.
The signs of discomfort from conservative and moderate bishops continued at
least until the end of the period that this study covers. In September of 1971, Dom Avelar
Brandão Vilela, one of the most prominent moderates, with close ties to the military and
also the president of the Latin American Episcopal Conference since 1968, gave a speech
at the Superior War College. On that occasion, the bishop not only criticized openly the
National Security Doctrine and the repression of youth and dissidents but went as far as
taking to task the regime “for not improving the distribution of wealth, observing that in
Brazil rich becoming richer and poor poorer.”145 The disappointment was massive.
The defense of human rights and the denunciation of torture were cohesive factors
for the episcopate that adopted a determined and institutional position in the defense of its
militants, churchmen and anybody affected by the repression. The commitment of the
Church to human rights was an international issue per se. Facing the strict limitations in
Brazil, the Church, the exiles and the defenders of human rights resorted to the
international community, and to the Vatican in particular, which fully supported the
Brazilian Church.
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A central pillar of the Church’s praxis in the defense of human rights was the
Brazilian Commission for Justice and Peace. The Commission had been in gestation
since the meeting of CELAM in Medellin and was officially created on October of
1969.146 This transnational enterprise helped to transform the perception of the Brazilian
Church from an institution that inappropriately got involved in politics, into a champion
of human rights and a legitimate institutional dissident. Gradually, the Church was
becoming the most critical antagonist of the regime. Ironically, in doing so, the Church
had silenced the most progressive of its individual voices.
In the following weeks after the assembly of the CNBB of May, bishops and
generals, both trying to hide their internal fissures, were trying to get to agreement. A
partial result would be achieved by July: “source stated that GOB, increasingly sensitive
to damage international image and prestige, proposed quid pro quo in which CNBB
would refrain from all activities to propagate stories violence abroad and GOB would
take reciprocal steps to reduce chances mistreatment prisoners.”147 This indicates that the
human rights campaign was having success.
Precisely, that success of the international campaign for human rights enraged the
military, who intensified the persecution of Catholic organizations such as the Catholic
Youth Workers and the ACO in the second half of 1970.148 At the height of the
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persecution in October, the police broke into the offices of the Jesuit Brazilian
Development Institute (Instituto Brasileiro de Desenvolvimento, IBRADES) in Rio de
Janeiro and detained the occupants, including bishop Dom Aloísio Lorscheider.149
If that was not enough, the use of torture was becoming massive. In a cable from
the northern city of Belem of September 14, an American priest gave details of the torture
of father José Antonio Monteiro Magalhães, who had been arrested with the French priest
Xavier de Maupeon in August in the city of São Luis.150 This sort of actions, which were
internationally denounced by the Church with the support of the Vatican, undermined the
image of the Brazilian regime overseas.151
Meanwhile, some bureaucratic changes were taking place within the Church. In
October 23 of 1970, Cardinal Agnelo Rossi was appointed director of the Sacred
Congregation for the Propagation of the Faith (also known as Congregation for
Evangelization of Peoples) and was replaced in the archdiocese of São Paulo by bishop
Dom Evaristo Arns. This was an important moment for the commitment of the Church to
human rights. From São Paulo’s archbishopric palace, Dom Evaristo would lead the
Church’s mission in protection of human rights.152
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A first round between Dom Evaristo and the regime was the trial, during February
and March of 1971, of the Italian priest Giulio Vicini and the social worker Yara Spadini,
who had been arrested and accused of subversion and militancy in the AP.153 American
cables followed the details of the trial, constantly assessing the state of the political
confrontation between the bishop and the military.154 In a report of September 9 that
deals entirely with the situation of the Church during the first months of the year, the
bishop’s defense of the two indicted was described as a “position that invited
confrontation,” whose objective was to assure for Arns a prominent role in the CNBB
conference that took place in February of 1971.155
The Church and Human Rights
The nine day meeting of the episcopate in February of 1971 in Belo Horizonte
was a milestone for the Brazilian Catholic Church, implying a change of cycle. The
CNBB had been marked by deep divisions and multiple agendas but in the two previous
years had been trying to reach a minimal consensus to make the Church act as a united
institution. The meeting of February of 1971 was the culmination of those efforts.
The central point of the meeting was the election of new officers for the
conference. With the departure of Cardinal Rossi to the Vatican some months ago, the
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Church was in the need for a new reorganization in the structure of the Conference. Dom
Aloísio Lorscheider, bishop of Santo Angelo, succeeded Rossi in the presidency. His
cousin Dom Ivo, auxiliary of Porto Alegre, succeeded Dom Aloísio as General Secretary.
Dom Avelar Brandão Vilela, bishop of Teresina and president of the CELAM, was
elected vice president to replace of Dom Alfredo Vicente Scherer. Other important posts
were also submitted to election, including the regional representatives to the
Conference.156
A 22 page long report issued on September by Ambassador William Rountree,
who had replaced Charles Elbrick at the end of 1970, went into the details of the meeting.
For the U.S., it was symbolically powerful that the bishops elected Dom Aloísio, who had
been detained by the military, though only for a few hours, in October of 1970, as
president of the Conference. Moreover, Dom Ivo, the new secretary, was actually held as
a progressive.
The ambassador remarked on the issuance of several documents at the end of the
meeting that included a “proclamation presenting the basic orientation of the Church in
today’s Brazil,” a total political success since it expressed consensus and set guidelines
for the role of the Church in the medium-term. Furthermore, the CNBB issued open
letters of support to Dom Evaristo Arns, Dom Waldyr Calheiros and the Dominican
Order of São Paulo. The first was by then involved directly in the trial against the
aforementioned Italian priest and the second was one of the top leaders of the progressive
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sector and was leading a campaign for the defense of human rights in his diocese of Volta
Redonda. Finally, the Dominicans of São Paulo were a common target of the regime that
accused them of terrorism and subversion. A final aspect of the meeting, of deep
symbolic connotation, was picked up by the ambassador:
This support of three churchmen, who in the public mind at least were thought to represent active
opposition to and confrontation with the State, was interpreted by many observers at the time as a
signal that the CNBB was ready to move into an open position of greater opposition to the
Government. The elections of more liberal CNBB officers seemed to confirm this hypothesis. So
did the convention’s selection of a representative to give the closing statement to the assembled
press corps. In a blunt challenge to the GOB, Dom Helder [sic] CAMARA, Archbishop of Olinda
and Recife and outspoken leader of the progressive wing of the hierarchy (whose very name is
anathema to the GOB), broke three years of silence vis-à-vis the Brazilian press. He did so
dramatically by presenting a summary of the meeting and the various manifestos.157

Something that does not appear in the cables which is vital to understand this
important shift in the Church is the nature of the repression during the second half of
1970. In previous years the bishops had been at least partially successful in negotiating
and interceding for the victims of the repression by direct communication with the
highest circles of the military establishment. In the last months, however, the military had
been deliberately reluctant to accede to the petitions of the episcopate. Kenneth Serbin
notes:
Fearful of being associated with the revolutionaries, naively confident of the religious sentiment of
the generals, and accustomed to social privilege, the bishops had taken years to understand the
violent nature of the regime, which the Jocistas [Catholic Youth Workers] and other grassroots
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militants had known all too well from the horrors of the jails. The bishops came to this realization
only after the detention of Dom Aloísio “directly wounded” the bishops, forcing them “to take up
a position of defense.”158

The bishops negated that the Church was moving towards open conflict with the
regime, something that, on the other hand, was never anything other than a press
construction. Even in the moments of most dangerous tension, the episcopate, including
most of the progressives, showed openness to dialogue with the military.159 At least
according to the cables of the Foreign Service, the U.S. was not too aware of the Bipartite
Commission, the space for high level dialogue between Church and government that
started meeting since November of 1970 and that is described in detail by Kenneth
Serbin.160
For the remainder of 1971 and during 1972, the U.S. diplomats kept reporting on
the Church, focusing again on its relations with the military. Confrontations took place as
in the previous years with peaks and valleys determined by the legal or illegal actions
against members of the Church and increasingly by facts of torture and violations of
human rights. In June of 1972, for instance, thirty-six political prisoners, including three
Dominican churchmen, started a hunger strike in protest against inhuman conditions that
lasted more than one month and ended with the mediation of bishop Dom Evaristo Arns.
A telegram of those days read: “Archbishop Arns left Sao Paulo [sic] for visit to Europe
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and U.S. and in departure statement to press raised hunger strike. He said that again he
had been denied access to prisoners.”161
The transnational power of the Church had become the main problem of the
military. By 1972, as a consequence of the continuous denunciation of torture, the image
of the regime in European and American public opinion was irreparable.162 The case of
the priest, Gerson da Conceição de Almeida, is very indicative in this regard. In a cable
from Washington on July of 1972, there appears a sympathetic concern for the fate of the
persecuted: “Senator Harris requests information on charges against Gerson da Conceicao
[sic], the state of his health, the address and names of his family, and if he can be
contacted by mail through the proper authorities.”163
Father Gerson had been arrested with four lay people on October of 1971 in the
southeastern estate of Espírito Santo. All of them belonged to a Catholic organization of
social and educational assistance that had been founded by the American priest Edmund
Nelson Leising. Father Gerson was imprisoned in Vila Militar in Rio de Janeiro without
being formally charged of any crime. Gerson and his friends had been submitted to
torture and one of them, Lucio de Brito Castelo Branco, had been placed on provisional
liberty as he “needed special medical attention as a result alleged mistreatment.”164 All of
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this information was provided by Leising himself to American officers in Rio de Janeiro
who added:
Embassy feels that extreme GOB sensitivity to what it would view as unwarranted interference in
its internal affairs by USG precludes providing all of above unconfirmed information to Senator
Harris, particularly if he intends to release and attribute it to either department and/or US embassy
Brazil. Would therefore suggest following draft language possible reply for department’s
consideration.165

This cable shows the general sentiment of the military regime that was
increasingly feeling isolated and overwhelmed by criticisms from abroad. It is very
revealing that the military authorities would regard the American diplomatic corps in
Brazil as a threat. Any network and institution with international scope, such as the
academic community or the Church, represented a threat to the government. The main
concern of the military was to conceal from the world their reiterated violations of human
rights. Evidently, both the power relations among the Brazilian institutions and the
American view of the country had undergone important changes in eight years.
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CHAPTER 5
Who is Observed?
The intense observation of the progressive members and sectors of the Catholic
Church by the U.S. was primarily related to the American view of those historical actors
as dangerous and threatening. That view was determined by the progressives’ opposition
to the dictatorship as well as by their eventual relation with ideologies held as
revolutionary. Other important actors within the Church who did not represent a threat to
the military regime garnered scarce attention.
Tradição, Família e Propriedade (TFP) was recognized as an “ultra-rightwing”
and “archconservative” Catholic movement that counted on the support of the regime in
its confrontation with the progressive Catholics.166 Inspired by the corporativist and
fascist regimes in Spain under Francisco Franco and Portugal under António de Oliveira
Salazar, this group propagated corporatist and authoritarian ideas and was disdainfully
regarded by the U.S. Although it did represent a threat to democracy, TFP appeared in
only a handful of cables. In the same way, right wing bishops like Dom Sigaud and Dom
Castro Mayer were not on the radar of the officers as were the progressives.
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Students
Organizations like the Movement for Basic Education, Catholic Youth Workers
and Catholic University Youth, among others, were the subject of intense observation and
concern. Those organizations were immense lay structures in which the so-called
communist infiltration took place. However, as the repression deepened after the AI5,
those weakened organizations gradually disappeared from the cables. Of particular
concern for the U.S. was the relation between the Church and the students.
The students and youth in general were the main objective of the state repression
during the National Security dictatorships of the Southern Cone. Although in the first
years of the Brazilian regime there was an evident split between the majority of the
episcopate hierarchy and the students, there remained a strong relation between some
bishops, priests, lay activists and the student organizations.
Church-student relations involved two main problematic issues from the
perspective of the U.S. officers. On one hand, the students, regarded as the breeding
ground for terrorism and subversive movements, would influence negatively the
churchmen and carry out the worrisome communist infiltration in the Church. On the
other hand, since the very beginning of the dictatorship, the U.S. showed concern about
the protection that the Church, particularly the orders and the progressive bishops,
afforded to the students.
That was one of the causes of the Church-state conflict that worsened in 1968
when the majority of the churchmen seemed decided to protect the students from state
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repression. In the aftermath of the AI5, the students were no longer a worry. Not only had
the repression undermined the movement’s capacity of mobilization but there was a
rupture with the Church. The moderate institutional approach of the Church and the
consequent appeasement of the socioeconomic criticisms, particularly since 1969, made
the youth feel abandoned by the hierarchy.
Bishops
Unlike the grassroots, which gradually lost relevance in the American cables after
the deepening of the repression, the bishops were the most conspicuous sector from
beginning to end. The conversations of American ambassadors, consuls and officers with
bishops reveal a growing effort by the U.S. to establish good and collaborative relations
with them. The bishops, on the other hand, always showed themselves receptive and open
to dialogue with the American Foreign Service. A sign of this is the high quantity of
conversations between churchmen and the U.S. officers.
The main referent for the U.S. in regards to the Brazilian Catholic Church was the
CNBB. The Conference of Brazilian Bishops was certainly the head of the national
Church and the space that gathered most of its leadership. Changes in the balance of
forces within the CNBB always affected enormously the rest of the Church; its annual
meetings, general conferences and declarations were taken as navigational charts. Finally,
readjustments in the top posts of the CNBB had enormous consequences for the direction
the Church would take on very important issues.
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Thus, the U.S. followed closely the meetings of the CNBB and the variations in
the balance of power between progressives and conservatives. The public declarations
that most of the time followed the meetings of the CNBB were always monitored and the
quantity of cables dealing with the Church invariably increased as the meetings
approached. Clearly, the American diplomats were interested in the reactions and
institutional postures of the CNBB in regards to the regime.
Naturally, the U.S. sought to create close ties with the main leaders of the Church:
the archbishops of Rio de Janeiro, São Paulo and Salvador, presidents and secretaries of
the CNBB and the Apostolic Nuncio. Two of the most usual interlocutors of the Foreign
Service were Dom Agnelo Rossi and Dom Eugênio de Araújo Sales. The American
officers were always eager to know the postures of these bishops and held in high esteem
their opinions.
Dom Eugênio was particularly regarded as a top and ascending leader, an opinion
that seemed to be shared by other personalities outside the Church.167 Dom Eugênio was
bishop in Salvador da Bahia, first as administrator since 1964 and as Archbishop after
1968. In April of 1969, he was elevated to Cardinal and in March of 1971, became
Archbishop of Rio de Janeiro, quite a stunning career that seemed to accord with the
capacities of the bishop.
I have pointed out some contradictions in the U.S. interpretation of Dom Eugênio.
In a cable of May of 1965, he is held, together with Dom Hélder and Dom Jerônimo, as a
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leader of the “social minded Catholic priests.”168 Several times, when asked about Dom
Hélder, Dom Eugênio expressed sympathy and proximity to the thought of the bishop of
Olinda and Recife. However, in a conversation with the Consul of Salvador, Harold M.
Midkiff, also on May of 1965, Dom Eugênio mentioned “some mistakes” of Dom
Jerônimo and referred to Popular Action as a “dangerous organization.”169
Later on, in April of 1969, a cable read: “The reporting officer detects a subtle
change in Dom Eugênio’s attitude vis a vis the Military Regime (towards greater
tolerance) possibly because of his new status in the College of Cardinals, and perhaps as
the result of policy emanating from the Vatican.”170 Finally, for the Foreign Service, the
appointment of Dom Eugênio as bishop of Rio de Janeiro was consequence of his good
relations with the military. Dom Eugênio was the choice of the Vatican against the
wishes of the local clergy who preferred the more progressive, Dom Aloísio.171 An
accurate view would define Dom Eugênio as a very pragmatic figure who was highly
interested in maintaining the public role of the Church through institutional means.172
Some bishops were subject to deep observation not for their relevance in the
balance of power within the Church but for their links with grassroots and students, their
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criticisms of the socioeconomic situation and their skirmishes with the regime. Some of
the more interesting for the U.S. were Dom Serafim Fernandes de Araújo of Belo
Horizonte, Dom José de Medeiros Delgado of Fortaleza and Dom Antônio Batista
Fragoso of Crateús. All of them were usual suspects in the U.S. view. Dom Fragoso, for
instance, was held as a highly controversial figure who had expressed sympathy for
Cuba, a crime of lese-empire by the time.173
There was a particular interest in the São Bento Monastery of Salvador that was
led by the Benedictines Dom Jerônimo de Sá Cavalcante and Dom Timóteo Amoroso
Anastácio. They were seen as particularly suspicious for their progressive ideas and their
commitments to the student movement. Other than Dom Serafim, all of these churchmen
lived in the complicated Northeast. It is clear that the bishops from that region were
regarded as particularly dangerous.
Dom Hélder Câmara
Dom Hélder Câmara stood out among the progressive bishops for his
revolutionary thought and the national and international recognition that he had as a
religious leader. For the Diplomatic Service there was no one more controversial,
important or dangerous than he. Dom Hélder was the reference of the American officers
for understanding the progressive wing of the Church; thus his name was present in most
of the cables of the period and there was a consistent effort in gathering information
about his public interventions, reactions, travels, contacts and other activities.
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In 1964, Dom Hélder was a rising international religious leader. In the next years
he would be given honorary doctorates from Harvard, the Sorbonne and 30 other
universities around the world.174 A master of public relations, until the dictatorship
Hélder was always a friend or acquaintance of the presidents in turn. Other than the
soccer player Pelé, Dom Hélder was probably the most famous person from Brazil in the
1960s and 1970s. Because of his international recognition, during the dictatorship he,
besides the intellectual Alceu Amoroso Lima, was probably the only dissident with a free
voice.175
Hélder Câmara was born in Fortaleza in 1909 and was ordained a priest when he
was 22 years old. Since his youth, Hélder became involved in programs of public
education of the state of Ceará, at a time when it was very common for priests to occupy
bureaucratic posts. Naturally inclined to politics, Hélder had been a member of the ultraright movement of integralismo. In 1936, Hélder moved to Rio de Janeiro where he
abandoned integralismo and moved closer to progressive intellectuals, politicians and
churchmen; some of them were living the ideological transformation from traditionalism
into rather liberal postures that he was living.
In Rio, Hélder befriended the lawyer Sobral Pinto, the intellectual Alceu Amoroso
Lima, the politician Santiago Dantas and the future bishop José Vicente Tavora; all of
them were or would be key elements of the progressive circles of Brazil. In 1947, Hélder
became vice-assessor general of the Catholic Action under the supervision of the
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Cardinal Câmara, just at the moment in which the movement was strengthening and
completing its transformation in a specialized pastoral movement of the French variety.176
Hélder had always shown leadership skills and abilities in communication. He
was central for the growth of the Catholic grassroots movement during the 1940s and
1950s. In Catholic Action, Hélder opened up his horizons and developed a broad view of
his Church and his country. The national organization of Catholic Action inspired him to
create the National Conference of Bishops of Brazil that came to life in 1952 as was
already mentioned.177 That same year, Hélder was named Auxiliary Bishop of Rio de
Janeiro and first General Secretary of the CNBB.
In 1955, during the International Eucharistic Congress of Rio de Janeiro,
organized by him and his task team, Hélder, in association with Bishop Manuel Larrain
of Chile, organized the first General Assembly of CELAM, the conference of Latin
American bishops. Hélder had become a national celebrity and a promising leader of the
Latin American Church. During the Vatican Council, Dom Hélder played an important
role in strengthening the position of the progressive bishops and gained worldwide
recognition as a dynamic leader.
Human dignity, social justice and peace were the backbone of Dom Hélder’s
thought; a global perspective that took into account the economic, political and spiritual
dimensions of humanity. For him, the achievement of those mutually inclusive objectives
was a revolutionary and necessary process. The centrality of non-violence in Dom
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Hélder’s thought made him close to figures like Martin Luther King, Mahatma Gandhi
and Nelson Mandela, leaders with whom the bishop felt deeply identified. Like them and
like the biblical prophets, Dom Hélder was a tireless critic of the status quo and like them
he faced persecution. In his position regarding capitalism, Dom Hélder, who was always
open to dialogue, built bridges with elements of Marxism.178 Nevertheless, this did not
stop him from formulating criticisms towards the socialist world led by the U.S.S.R that
had produced the Berlin Wall and the invasion of Czechoslovakia.
There is an important quantity of cables that mention Dom Hélder, reports about
his speeches, public declarations and conversations with him. This indicates that, on one
hand, the American officers had weighted well his relevance, yet on the other hand, Dom
Hélder was a constant concern for the U.S. One of his speeches that riveted the attention
of U.S. diplomats was delivered on May 2 of 1965 in Recife at the inauguration of the
Northeastern Regional Seminary. On that occasion, the Minister Consul General Edward
J. Rowell paid particular attention to the criticisms of the bishop to the developed
countries and their “anti-American implications.”
Rowell seems to catch a contradiction in Dom Hélder’s behavior: “Despite the
tone of the speech he went out of his way to greet publicly the presence of [the American
Catholic] Bishop Carroll and to thank the American hierarchy for its aid to the
Seminary.” This suggests that for the officer, it was difficult to differentiate between an
intellectual criticism of the U.S. and personal resentment toward U.S. citizens or Church.
The cable follows: “Dom Hélder shows no signs of abandoning his views of the Church’s
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role as an instigator of change and reform in society, nor his quasi-Marxist or---perhaps
more accurately---“colonial” view of world affairs.” The officer also depicts the bishop
as an egocentric whose expressions of humility are ostentatious.
The paternalistic character of the National Security ideology is evident in
Rowell’s comments: “Although observers’ views of his personality differ, the reporting
officer, at least, finds what might otherwise be an obnoxious egotism much mitigated by
an almost child-like enthusiasm and delight in what he is doing.”179 The cable also refers
to a recent travel of the bishop to France where he had received ovations. This comment
points out that by 1965, Dom Hélder was already being traced by the U.S. intelligence
and/or diplomacy as a figure with international relevance.
Part of the power of Dom Hélder was his good relations with the Vatican. Since
he and monsignore Giovanni Montini met in 1950 in Rome, the two churchmen had
cultivated a strong friendship. As important members of the Catholic Action in their
respective countries, they had common grounds. Montini, first as Vatican’s Secretary of
State and as Pope Paul VI after, had been a loyal supporter of the initiatives of the
Brazilian bishop. All those elements were continuously weighted in the American cables
of the time.
For the U.S., the political strength and public postures of Dom Hélder were the
main referent for the rest of the progressive wing. Consequently, the conflicts that
involved the Brazilian security forces with the bishop had deep consequences for the
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general relations between Church and state. The public declarations of Dom Hélder were
usually taken as battle cries that incited the progressives to intensify their criticisms
towards the regime. Occasionally, the opinions of the bishop would be interpreted in U.S.
diplomatic communications as erroneous interpretations of reality.
That was the interpretation of ambassador Tuthill of Dom Hélder’s criticisms of
the failures of the Superintendency for the Development of the Northeast
(Superintendência do Desenvolvimento do Nordeste, SUDENE) in 1968. In a cable of
May 31, the ambassador endorsed a report that interpreted the criticism of Dom Hélder to
SUDENE as the consequence of a misunderstanding by the bishop of the obstacles that
the government faced in its efforts to develop the region.180
The American collaborationist approach to the Church that timidly emerged in the
aftermath of the AI5 was also applied to Dom Hélder. In a cable of January of that year,
the Consulate in Recife showed itself willing to have a good relation with the bishop. The
telegram referred to a cordial conversation between the officers of the Consulate and
Dom Hélder in which the latter said “he understood officials and communications media
in US had taken stand critical of recent events with media particularly critical.”181 The
bishop also showed comprehension for the “difficult position” in which the U.S. was
placed (see pp. 65-68). This indicates the willingness of both Dom Hélder and the
Consulate to establish a fluent dialogue.
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Yet, Dom Hélder remained an undesirable element for the U.S. In March of 1969,
during a graduation ceremony in the Catholic University of São Paulo, Dom Hélder made
“a strident call for basic reforms in Brazil.”182 In April, the Consulate of Recife reported
acts of violence and terrorism from the extreme right in which elements of the Command
of Communist Hunting (Comando de Caça aos Comunistas, CCC) took part with the
acquiescence of military authorities in Recife; the telegram alerted readers that the
“situation is further complicated by Archbishop Dom Helder Camara’s recent more
bellicose posture [that] clearly indicates willingness to risk confrontation with
government over student issue.”183 Naturally, the “student issue” in this context means
support of the student movement in spite of the disapproval of the regime. Later on, the
Consulate reported that the bishop “used the occasion of masses on June 27
commemorating the 30-day anniversary of the murder of Father Antonio Henrique
Pereira Neto again to speak out publicly against the prevailing political situation.”184
Dom Hélder was the enemy number 1 of the military regime. The murder of
father Henrique was the height of a systematic campaign against the bishop that included
mortal threats, machine-gunning of his house and other intimidating tactics. Moreover,
the military and the U.S. officers expected that the repression of the progressive Catholic
grassroots movement would undermine the power of the bishop. Conversely, the military
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contributed to making of Dom Hélder a worldwide prophet and a symbol of religiousbased opposition to the status quo.
The Department of State had always been watchful of the travels of Dom Hélder,
particularly to the U.S. In November of 1969, an officer of the Consulate of Recife
visited the bishop in the Archbishop’s palace and asked him about his plans for travel to
North America and Europe scheduled for January of 1970. The officer was not only
interested in the content of the bishop’s message, but also in the funding for the travel as
suggested by the mention of the matter in the cable: “According to Dom Hélder, his visits
to Canada and the United States will be sponsored by “church groups and universities,”
including the University of Detroit and Columbia University.”185
The international prophetic mission of Dom Hélder caught even greater attention
of the U.S. Service in 1970.186 The “low key” posture of the Church, adopted since 1969
and made official in the CNBB meeting of February of 1970, had reduced the capacity of
communication of Dom Hélder, the clearest individual voice of the Church. More
importantly, the military expressly prohibited the reproduction of Hélder’s statements or
even the mention of his name in the media. Consequently, the bishop had to find his
audience in the international community.
Interestingly enough, the U.S. was for Dom Hélder a place of free speech, where
he was not submitted to the sort of attacks that he was used to facing in his own country.
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After a conversation of Dom Hélder with ambassador Elbrick, the consul Donor Lion and
another officer of the Consulate, in August of 1969, the diplomatics noted: “Dom Hélder
remarked that it was ironic that the American Ambassador and other US. Government
officials in Recife were unafraid to meet with him while many Brazilian authorities, both
civil and military seemed intimidated.”187
As in many other conversations with American officers, Dom Hélder did not hide
his criticisms to the dictatorship’s “failure to implement basic reforms.” Moreover, the
bishop always expressed his conviction of the potential of the U.S. to influence positively
the Brazilian regime. With this outlook, the bishop tried to influence the American
posture without expressing his criticisms to the U.S. in a negative way: “He claims that
the US must bear a large measure of responsibility for correcting these injustices in Latin
America since, whether the Latins like it or not, they are part of the United States’ zone
of influence.”188 Though not obviously, the reproach was always there.
Dom Hélder took abroad his discourse of non-violence and social justice. In
United States, he not only addressed the problems of his country and the third world but
also talked openly about the Vietnam War and the threat to democracy that the
“industrial-military complex” represented.189 His impact in the U.S. was important; the
bishop was central in the conformation of religious-academic networks that denounced
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the Brazilian situation in the U.S. and Europe.190 Dom Hélder also had close ties with the
Civil Rights Movement191 and leaders like the priest and activist Phillip Berrigan and his
movement of denunciation of the Vietnam War.192
The U.S. officers were aware of the success with which the “itinerant and highly
controversial” bishop was denouncing the atrocities of the regime abroad. A cable of
November of 1970 reported the accusations made by the Governor of São Paulo, Roberto
de Abreu Sodré, against Dom Hélder after the Governor’s visit to Europe: “Apparently
the Governor came back in a state of high pique consequent to the atmosphere of
misunderstanding and hostility to Brazil he encountered in some quarters in Western
Europe, notably in youth and journalistic circles.”193 The U.S. officers followed all the
controversy in the course of which Abreu Sodré called the bishop a “Fidel Castro in
cassock” and Cardinal Rossi interceded on behalf of Dom Hélder. That was only one
example of the many attacks to Dom Hélder from the Brazilian establishment that
strengthened the notion of Dom Hélder as a persecuted dissident.
The monitoring of the activities of Dom Hélder, in Brazil and abroad, continued
during 1971 and 1972. By that time, the bishop was already regarded as a prophet of his
time. The U.S. consular view of him combined an awareness of his historical relevance
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with the reservations that are already clear. In a cable issued in Washington on June of
1971, George Lister, a central figure in the human rights policy of the State Department,
expressed a desire to meet the bishop; this was in the framework of an eventual trip of
Dom Hélder to Washington (finally aborted), where he had some academic and religious
commitments sponsored by the National Office for Black Catholics.194
The contact of Dom Hélder in Washington was Brady Tyson, a Methodist
missionary and academic who was living in São Paulo at the time of the coup d’état but
had left Brazil in March of 1966 due to pressures from the regime.195 Tyson was an active
part of the international academic-religious network of denunciation and opposition to the
Brazilian dictatorship, and would later join the diplomatic corps during the Jimmy Carter
administration.
The last cable of the 1964-1972 period that deals entirely with Dom Hélder, dates
from August of 1972. In the report of a conversation, the recently appointed Consul of
Recife, Calvin C. Berlin, commented on the current situation of Dom Hélder: “He gives
the impression of being quite isolated from both official circles and sources of influence,
a position that attests to the effectiveness of the government in cutting off his lines of
communication. His ready accessibility may be due in large part to the fact that many
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people hesitate to seek him out for fear of adverse repercussions on the part of the
government.”196
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CHAPTER 6
Conclusions
The Catholic Church was an important factor in the history of Brazil during the
twentieth century. As a consequence of its involvement in the public life, a myriad of
worldviews that can be interpreted as different political positions abounded in the
Brazilian Church. In this context, a vital progressive movement emerged within the
Church in the 1940s and 1950s. One principal factor in this development was the constant
influx of European and North American priests. Foreign priests have had a significant
presence in the Brazilian Church and were channels for the spread of avant-garde French
Catholic ideas in Brazil.
A common element of the French school was the importance given to the lay
apostolate and the active dialogue with modern narratives. This was the basis for the
development of Catholic Action, a group of lay organizations mainly constituted by
young workers and students. Gradually, progressivist thought permeated all sectors of the
Church, including the episcopate, but strengthened particularly within the orders and the
Northeast region. Those sectors developed a social commitment to the subordinate
classes and an ethical criticism of inequality, social injustice and oppression. As a result,
the Catholic Church built strong ties with other progressive sectors of society, such as
students, intellectuals and statesmen.
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During the 1960s, in the aftermath of the Cuban Revolution, the forces of change,
including the Catholic progressivism, got caught amidst a violent political confrontation
that would prove definitive for the history of Latin America. United States was a
principal instigator of this conflict. In the framework of the imperialist relations with
Latin America, the U.S. spread the Doctrine of National Security as a means to maintain
its hegemony in the region. The Doctrine, an international version of McCarthyism, was
used to squash the progressive thought through the continent.
The Doctrine, characterized by authoritarianism, paternalism and Manichaeism,
fit well in the mind of the Latin American military. During the 1960s and 1970s, the
United States encouraged, supported and at times arranged the imposition of military
dictatorships in the Southern Cone. These dictatorships employed policies of terror and
dirty war to destroy revolutionary and liberationist movements. Churchmen, intellectuals,
and especially students, were the targets of the repression. The coup d’état that installed a
20 year long dictatorship in Brazil in 1964, though orchestrated from the Brazilian
military, was part of that broader process.
Unable to distinguish among its enemies, and imbued with the Manichaean
ideology of National Security, the dictatorship massively employed repression against the
Catholic Church. Although the military were successful in undermining the Catholic
grassroots, they actually generated an unfavorable attitude in most segments of the
Church, including the powerful bishops. As a consequence, the first five years of
dictatorship were characterized by several confrontations between the Church and the
regime.
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According to the lines of National Security, during this time the United States
developed a great interest in the progressive sectors of Brazilian Catholicism, namely the
Catholic Action movement, foreign priests and the bishops of the Northeast among
others. Those sectors had the capacity to carry out important reforms in Brazil but were
thought to be a threat to the interests of the U.S. The Catholic Action movement, one of
the most progressive experiments in the history of the Church, was regarded as a factor of
communist infiltration. Particularly alarming were the sympathies between churchmen
and students, latter being anathema for National Security. During the repression of the
student movement between 1966 and 1968, the State Department got very interested the
São Bento Monastery, the orders and some bishops who supported and protected the
youth from the state repression.
Since most of the progressive movement was grounded in the Northeast dioceses,
that region captured most of the attention of the U.S. The indisputable leader of the
movement was the charismatic bishop of Olinda and Recife, Dom Hélder Câmara. This
worldwide famous religious leader was for the U.S. the reference for the whole
progressive movement. The cables of the American posts in Brazil during that time exude
disapproval and even animosity towards this bishop, who was seen as a dangerous figure.
During the 1964-1972 period, the U.S. followed closely the steps and words of Dom
Hélder in Brazil and abroad. His dangerousness rested both in his prophetic mission and
the wide recognition he enjoyed nationally and internationally. His criticisms of the
status quo and denunciations of the repressive character of the regime, as those of the
other progressive leaders of the Church, were for the U.S. undesirable acts of war.
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“Church-state relations” was the overarching element of the American worries in
regards to the Brazilian Church. It was a common label in boxes, folders and cables in the
archives of the communications with the Foreign Mission in Brazil. Bearing in mind that
during this period those relations were characterized by political conflict, the Church was,
for the U.S, a destabilizing element for a military dictatorship that was seen, ironically, as
defender of liberty and democracy. In regard to the public confrontations between both
institutions, the American diplomats showed concern for how these conflicts undermined
the image and legitimacy of the military. That explains the deep interest of the U.S. in the
official positions of the CNBB toward the regime during the meetings of the episcopate.
The United States was ideologically and politically committed to the Brazilian
dictatorship from the very beginning. Therefore, the State Department’s interpretation of
the Church was dictated by the American concern for the preservation of the regime
rather than for justice and democracy. The interests and concerns of the U.S. officials
must be contrasted with those important elements that are absent in the cables or that only
obliquely receive attention. The “Church-state relations” approach is in some way
deceitful. It implies the perception of a conflict between two equal parts; the reporting of
Church-state relations has the appearance of a neutral assessment, based on a
preoccupation with the preservation of democracy and stability in Brazil. But this
objective language actually obscures the reality of the political persecution of the Church
along with other organized groups by the military.
Acts of violence against the Church were not a concern for the U.S., as a long as
they did not represent a public confrontation capable of garnering new opponents of the
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military. When reporting about arrests, detentions, torture and censorship, the officers
invariably focused on how those events would be used to “criticize the government.” In
that way, violations of human rights and the political persecution of the Church were
highly hidden in the cables. That political commitment of the U.S. with the military
regime was evident especially in the cables about the murder of father Henrique Pereira
Neto in May of 1969.
The American “Church-state relations” approach entails an irony. The physical
and symbolic violence against the Church was less important than the public reaction of
the Church or any of its members. In other words, the linguistic performances of the
churchmen, such as speeches and public letters, and the journalistic coverage about them,
were for the U.S. a more important element of the political struggle than torture and
political persecution. The symbolic acts of the Church were regarded as “bellicose”
statements that were used as weapons in leftist attacks against the regime. On the other
hand, the military, at least in these cables, was presented chiefly as a rational and
voiceless entity.
The fact that public statements by bishops were, in the American view, the central
element in the Church-state conflict brings up the relevance of the press. Newspapers
were the space par excellence in which the public statements and letters of the bishops
appeared. Particularly in the years prior to the imposition of full censorship, the press was
the field in which the political confrontation took place. The enormous capacity of public
opinion to affect the regime was demonstrated by the heavy efforts of the military in
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imposing censorship. As any other authoritarian regime, the Brazilian dictatorship made
an enormous effort to hide its atrocities.
Besides personal conversations between the American officers and well-informed
people, the press was the principal source of information for the U.S. about the Churchstate conflict. Obviously, part of the job of the officers was to submit the information that
they gathered to critical analysis and contrast it with human sources. The analytical
process allowed the officers to interpret reality more deeply than any newspaper. Still the
reliance of American reporting officers upon the press confirms the centrality of mass
media as a channeling element of public attention.
The cables about bishop Dom Hélder Câmara are an example of how the
American view of the Church was heavily influenced by the media. Most of the time, the
bishop was described as “controversial” or even “highly controversial.” Controversy
refers directly to a public matter, a public opposition that, at least until 1968, took place
in the press field or was reproduced by the press. Therefore, the American view of Dom
Hélder was highly influenced by the characterization that newspapers made of him.
The interest of the U.S. in the Church, as any historical phenomenon, was neither
static nor absolute. National Security did not account for the whole American view of the
Church during those years. According to the cables, another view became very important
after the radicalization of the dictatorship on December of 1968 when persecution
became systematic and repression an official policy. This had as a consequence an
increasing rejection of the Brazilian regime in the international scenario, namely in the
United States and Europe. In this context, the Church opted for avoiding individual
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confrontations with the military but adopted a policy of total opposition to the anti-human
rights policy of the regime. That opposition resulted in protection of dissidents in Brazil
and denunciation of the situation abroad.
Then, the American interest had a subtle change. Besides the “Church-state
relations,” an idea of the Church as a fundamental element for social change in Brazil
emerged. This ignited a systematic effort to gather information and seek bilateral
dialogue with the most conspicuous members and sectors of the Church. It was a
pragmatic approach. As a prime order institution, with national reach that crosses all
regions, classes, genres and political ideas, the Church was seen as a potential node for
the U.S. intervention in Brazil.
The “collaboration for social change” attitude of the kind of the Alliance for
Progress has never been at odds with authoritarianism. Both are part of a historical
dialectic present across the different aspects of the U.S. hegemony in Latin America that
is commonly known as “carrot and stick approach.” Historically, when the U.S. refers to
social change in Latin America, this means a very gradual process carried out through
modernization and intended to appease progressive, liberationist and revolutionary
movements.
In sum, the American view of the Catholic Church in Brazil was determined by
the political commitment of the United States to the Brazilian dictatorship. During the
1964-1972 period the interest was ruled by the ideology of National Security Doctrine
and the pragmatic need to establish collaborative relations with the most powerful sectors
of Brazil. The understanding of the first approach is particularly important to understand
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the changes in the religious-political arena of Brazil and Latin American during the 1970s
and 1980s. Those were years characterized by an ecclesiastical and political reaction
against the progressive sectors of the Catholic Church.
Further Research Possibilities
Further research endeavors in the field intended to deal with the political
repression of Liberation Christianity and Liberation Theology should contain the
continental perspective in which United States played an important role. Some of those
endeavors could contain information from thus far classified information of the State
Department and the CIA, which have been protagonists in the political and religious
conflicts of Latin America for more than fifty years, though sometimes their involvement
is obscured. Moreover, any research that uses cables of the American Foreign Service
should include a call to question the legitimacy of the hegemonic presence of the U.S. in
foreign countries through its diplomatic apparatus.
Interestingly enough, the “Church-state relations” approach, so present in the
cables used for this research, remains in the American scholarship about this important
period of Brazilian history. The question arises as to whether this approach in the
academic community still contains the methodological problems that became clear in this
thesis. Meanwhile, I am hopeful that with this research I have contributed to the
understanding of the international aspects of the Brazilian Catholic Church during the
times of the dictatorship in which the works of Penny Lernoux and James Green remain
so important.
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The international approach should also contribute to understand the successes and
failures of the progressive and liberationist national movements in Latin America. The
deeds of the Brazilian Catholic Church during the dictatorship have had enormous
consequences that have continued until today. The same judgment applies to Ecuador and
Bolivia in which the Church helped to form the basis of deep processes of renovation that
continue to the present day. Comparative works could help us understand how the
different situations and behavior of the historical actors had positive and negative
consequences for the social change and the still so unhopeful present of most of Latin
America.
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Appendix 1: Cable from Washington to Ambassador Gordon during the coup d’état
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Appendix 2: Distribution of cables by months and years
MONTH/YEAR 1964 1965 1966 1967 1968 1969 1970 1971 1972
January
2
7
1
1
February
11
2
5
March
1
3
3
3
April
3
4
3
2
3
May
2
2
5
5
June
3
2
1
6
3
1
2
July
1
7
4
1
7
August
2
3
7
2
3
September
2
2
3
4
2
October
1
9
1
1
November
3
6
1
December
1
5
3
Total Docs
7
4
3
11
61
42
19
20 167
Total Pages
28
14
11
54 249 110
54
32 552
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Appendix 3: First page of cable (August 19, 1966)
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Appendix 4: First page of cable (August 26, 1966)
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